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Political parties serve as a link between the state and society. Being so, they have a 
fundamental role in the consolidation of democratic values. It then becomes important to 
understand their internal functions and character. The purpose of this thesis is to measure 
the levels of intra-party democracy within three opposition political parties in Southern 
Africa. Also, this thesis seeks to show whether authoritarian political culture has an affect 
on a democratic party’s behavior. This thesis will strive to show that as party levels of 
intra-party democracy decrease, fracturing in the party increases. A qualitative case study 
was conducted on UNITA in Angola, the ANC in South Africa, and the MDC in Zimbabwe. A 
content analysis was performed on the parties’ respective constitutions and official party 
documents, as well as other scholarly writings. This was paired with an historical analysis 
of the case states and parties. The parties were assessed along a determined framework for 
intra-party democracy: political environment, legal framework of the state and party, the 
inclusiveness of the party, and party economics. Inclusiveness of the party gauges 
membership participation, leadership competition, gender parity, and oversight. The ANC 
exhibited the highest levels of intra-party democracy, and has shown the most stability. 
The MDC was found to have the lowest levels, and has split multiple times in recent years. 
All the parties demonstrated a need to open leadership participation and create better 
oversight mechanisms. Political parties proved to be a critical element in a state’s potential 
democratic development, and though there exists deficiencies, the political parties of this 
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Ghana was the first sub-Saharan African state to achieve independence in 1957, a period 
that marked the beginning of the end of colonization on the Continent.1 Since then, Africa 
has experienced a varied and complex relationship with democracy. Nowhere are these 
complexities more embodied than in the political parties that act as the conduit for the 
people and the government. Yet, scholarship on the subject of political parties has only 
recently become an academic pursuit, especially in emerging democracies in the 
developing world. In fact, “so fundamental are political parties to the operation of modern 
politics that their role and significance are often taken for granted.”2 
 When discussing the nature of politics it becomes easy to get embroiled in details 
like the impact of a political system or the cultural idiosyncrasies of the population, while 
political parties themselves are more of an afterthought, if considered at all. Thus, while we 
take into account whether or not a state is authoritarian and its inherent impact on that 
society, the essence of a political party and its impact on a society is often overlooked. The 
objective of this thesis is to go beyond the face value of a political party and try to gain a 
deeper understanding of the internal functions of these organizations. This thesis seeks to 
accomplish the following: 
                                                        
1 When referring to Africa, it has now become customary to capitalize “Continent” as it has become 
a commonly substituted synonym in the text. 
2Andrew Heywood. 2002. Politics. New York. Palgrave Macmillan. P. 73. 
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• Determine the levels of internal democratic practices within the selected political 
parties. 
• Provide a regional analysis of party politics in Southern Africa. 
• Determine attributes that a party can be measured on. 
•  Better understand the current democratization process in Southern Africa. 
• And, to show whether or not authoritarian political culture can have an impact on 
the behavior of democratic political parties.   
Specifically, an analysis of the internal democratic practices of a political party in the 
Southern African region will be conducted in order to gauge the extent to which political 
parties espouse democratic ideals and to what extent they execute those ideals. As 
Augustine Magolowondo has stated, “if political parties are building blocks of democracy, 
they cannot afford to not be democratic themselves for to do so is a contradiction both in 
terms and in values.”3   
While scholarship on the subject of political parties in sub-Saharan Africa is 
beginning to trickle in, much of the discussion has been focused on the process of 
democratization as a whole. Earl Conteh-Morgan describes democratization as “a process 
of establishing a form of governance in which mechanisms are created to ensure 
participation at all levels of politics, responsible leadership, and civil liberties“4, while 
                                                        
3 Augustine Magolowondo. 2007. Understanding Intra-party Democracy in Africa: Issues and 
Questions. NIMD. Pg. 1. 
4 Earl Conteh-Morgan. 1997. Democratization in Africa: The Theory and Dynamics of Political 
Transitions. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers. P. 7. 
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Kidane Mengisteab and Cyril K. Daddieh, in their book State Building and Democratization 
in Africa, present a series of essays on the basic theory of democratization while giving 
examples from daily African reality of what outcomes democratization has produced. These 
texts, like many others, do a superb job of expressing the nuances of the democratization 
process, yet, the focus remains broad and rarely does the literature provide sufficient 
scrutiny of political party processes. 
As mentioned above, research has been steadily increasing on the subject of political 
parties in Africa, and not just on the decisions they engage in but also on their nature. This 
thesis could not be produced without the foundation laid by previous researchers and their 
scrupulous efforts. Much of the relevant research on the internal functioning of political 
parties, at least in the Southern African region, has been conducted within the last twenty 
years as the focus has shifted to the parties themselves.  
Research shows that the nature and development of a state has a profound impact 
on political parties. Through an analysis of the political parties and how they govern, Wole 
Olaleye deduces that the one-party state, a state in which only one party controls the 
political, economic, and social trajectory of the state, has produced for many African 
countries a chaotic political system; intrinsically weak and open to abuses.5 Khabele 
Matlosa’s work in identifying challenges that political parties in Africa face with regards to 
                                                        
5 This is especially the case in Zimbabwe, where many of the parties are characterized “by ethnicity, 
clientelism, patronage, and highly centralized political power structures.” Wole Olaleye. 2003. 
Political Parties and Multi-party Elections in Southern Africa. SADC Insight IV. 
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internal democratic practices helps highlight some of the critical areas that parties must be 
aware of and can also be used as a barometer for a party’s development.6 
This research will also explore the institutions that monitor and study political 
parties, both inside the Continent and without. The Electoral Institute for Sustainable 
Democracy in Africa (EISA) is a regionally based entity that has conducted extensive 
fieldwork and scholarship on the various forces of democratization at work in Africa. 
According to their mission statement, “EISA strives for excellence in the promotion of 
credible elections, citizen participation, and the strengthening of political institutions for 
sustainable democracy in Africa.”7 Behind this general statement of goals is a plethora of 
research and perspectives that have helped to crystallize the political realities in places and 
states that have traditionally been hard to access. The Netherlands Institute for Multiparty 
Democracy (NIMD) is another such organization that helps to identify key challenges both 
parties and states face when attempting to consolidate democratic practices and 
institutions.  
The research also contributes to our understanding of how the democratization 
process has evolved over the course of the twenty plus years since the end of the Cold War. 
With the end of the Cold War Africa has seen a vociferous wave of democratization, 
especially in the southern region, and many African voices are contributing extensively to 
                                                        
6 Among these critical areas are: leadership, primary elections, party funding, gender equality, and 
management of the internal affairs of the party. These are general guidelines and are not 
exhaustive of the critical areas that can present themselves. 
7 The website for EISA. “About.” 
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the academic dialogue in politics on the Continent. 8 Though, while the literature effectively 
identifies the key challenges political parties face today, as well as the democratic 
institutions they serve, there is a lack of research on the extent to which political parties 
espouse and practice what is termed intra-party democracy, otherwise know as internal 
democratic practices. This thesis explores the democratic practices of Southern African 
political parties, specifically opposition political parties, to determine how effectively intra-
party democracy is performed, if at all.  
Design & Methods  
 
This thesis asks whether authoritarian political culture helps cultivate authoritarian 
attitudes in self-described democratic groups, and if so, what is the impact and how does it 
affect that organization’s behavior? The hypothesis is that as the level of adherence to 
internal democratic values and practices goes down within an opposition political party, 
the level of disaffection within that party grows, causing a splintering effect for the party. 
This in turn decreases the level of organized opposition faced by the ruling party, 
ultimately helping to keep the authoritarian regime entrenched. A qualitative case study 
presents the best opportunity to achieve the goals of this thesis.  
A predetermined political party was chosen from three different Southern African 
states. The parties and states include The National Union for the Total Independence of 
                                                        
8 The one-party era in the Southern African region, now the SADC, came after the fall of the initial 
wave of multiparty democracy in the independence era. It lasted until the early 1990s, and the fall 
of the Soviet Union. The end of Apartheid formally ended decades of regional instability and 
helped facilitate the rise of the current multiparty era in the SADC. 
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Angola, known in Portuguese as União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola 
(UNITA), in Angola, the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, and the Movement 
for Democratic Change (MDC) in Zimbabwe. The reason for the selection of these particular 
states is two-fold. First, all the states reside in the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) regional organization and second, each state has a distinctive colonial 
history with particular colonial powers.9 This provides for both a regional analysis of 
political parties, as well as an analysis of the behavior of parties that are the product of 
different colonial experiences. Parties will be compared with each other over certain 
values, including: their inclusiveness, their legal framework, economic distribution, and the 
nature of their electoral systems. 
 There are a few qualities about the nature of the subject being studied that make 
qualitative research optimal. Firstly, the organizations and the systems they operate in are 
complex, and necessarily make their processes complex as well. Qualitative research 
provides a chance to better understand these complexities. Secondly, this research seeks to 
use an exploratory approach to understand informal and unstructured linkages and 
processes in the previously mentioned organizations. And lastly, for practical reasons like 
location and resources, this research cannot be done experimentally. 
 A content analysis of the official constitutions of the political parties, the constitutions 
of their respective states, along with reports and observations from the previously 
                                                        
9 Angola was colonized by Portugal, while South Africa was colonized by first the Dutch, then the 
British. Zimbabwe was conquered and colonized by the British, led by diamond magnet Cecil 
Rhodes, who formally named the colony Rhodesia. 
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mentioned electoral institutes will serve as the primary source of data. From these data, 
one can develop an understanding of the values the party wants to project, the standards 
they set, and how they view themselves. Currently, each political party to be focused on 
operates under a functioning constitution. Other official documents can be culled from the 
SADC, and other organizations like the African Union (AU), Africa’s continental political 
body, or the United Nations (UN). Also, documents generated by the State itself or any 
other official documents put forth by the opposition party will be used. Data will also be 
gathered by performing a document analysis of the literature mentioned earlier in the 
introduction. Many of these texts are published works found in the UCF library, while other 
writings are from scholarly journals culled from the JSTOR database, as well as 
compilations of essays published by different universities or policy-oriented organizations. 
The document analysis will be coupled with a historical analysis of the states and the 
organizations in question, which is integral to understanding any political process 
occurring in Africa.   
 How this data will be managed is closely related to the analytical strategy being 
employed. Two key strategies for analysis, editing style and immersion/crystallization 
style, will be employed. This means that categories will not be predetermined, but will be 
coded as the research presents areas of meaning. As this thesis develops, themes and 







The model constructed herein required definite parameters to met in the selection of the 
case states of Angola, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. Certain delimitations have helped 
facilitate the selection process for these states. One condition discussed already is their 
membership in the SADC. The states chosen from there must fit the model of an 
authoritarian state, in which the ruling party exercises considerable control over the 
political and economic spheres. Also, the states must be relatively free from major civil 
strife. Major civil strife in this case constitutes a complete societal breakdown into anarchy, 
or an all-encompassing civil war, in which political parties would have no reason to 
operate.10 The deciding factor here is that there must be just enough tolerance by the state 
to open adequate political space for opposition parties to maneuver in, while not being 
completely stifled. An analysis of the literature shows the states chosen do indeed fit this 
model.  
A special note must be made, however, on South Africa. South Africa is not currently 
an authoritarian state, nor is the African National Congress (ANC) an opposition political 
party, but from the ANC’s inception, they have fit this description for the model. The ANC 
was formed in 1912 as a response to the gross mistreatment of Africans on the part of 
Dutch and British settlers. They presented the most vigorous challenge to the apartheid 
regime, the National Party (NP), which was highly authoritarian. Though the ANC has 
                                                        
10 Since the end of the Angolan Civil War in 2002, the slow process of democratic consolidation has 
taken root, though in starts-and-fits, and there is adequate space and tolerance to allow a 
somewhat peaceful political process. 
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reached the highest pinnacle a political party can achieve in their society, they started as a 
democratic alternative to the racism and overt authoritarianism of the NP, which was the 
party in power in South Africa from 1948 until Nelson Mandela's election in 1994. South 
Africa presents us with an opportunity to compare an opposition party that has triumphed 
to those still struggling. 
The type of political party this thesis is concerned with is that of opposition political 
parties. Opposition political parties can be classified in a few ways. First, they enjoy only a 
minority of the electorate’s votes, thus having a smaller presence in parliament and other 
governmental posts. Second, not all opposition parties in Africa are democratic. It is those 
opposition parties that classify themselves as democratic and present themselves to their 
respective electorates as democratic alternatives to the current authoritarian regimes that 
will be chosen. These are opposition parties that have formed and institutionalized 
democratic ideals within the party structure. And third, many African opposition parties 
lack the structure and resources to effectively contest power. Therefore, those opposition 
parties that present the most robust challenge to the authoritarian regime within their 
respective state are what this thesis will be concerned with. 
At this point, a scholar of Southern Africa may be wondering why the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), formally Zaire, wasn’t chosen. The DRC has experienced extreme 
social upheaval; a tremendous amount of political instability, and in the 2000s was the 
scene of a brutal war that involved the armies of nine African countries, and over 5 million 
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deaths.11 This was set off by both the collapsing kleptocracy, a political system in which 
corruption has been institutionalized, of Mobutu Sese Seko, then president of Zaire, and the 
Rwandan genocide that evolved into the Rwandan Civil War, which spilled over into Zaire. 
The stain that decades of Mobutu’s rule had on the political landscape, along with its 
sordid experience with Belgium colonialism, has endowed the DRC with one of the most 
volatile political arenas to try to gain access to. This political disharmony was further 
perpetuated by the fractious rule of Laurent-Désiré Kabila, whose army ousted Mobutu and 
was comprised of several different factions.12 Kabila also had been known to have 
“surrounded himself with child soldiers, much to the chagrin of visiting diplomats and 
dignitaries.”13 For these reasons, among many others, the DRC was not chosen. The hostile 
conditions make access to data extremely difficult. It also makes data sometimes unreliable. 
In addition, one of the requirements for this study was adequate political space for parties 
to maneuver in, which doesn’t truly exist in the DRC as it is only really a democracy in name 
and bears only the basic operational trappings of democracy with none of the intended 
spirit.  
                                                        
11 Jason K. Stearns’s Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of 
Africa gives a stunning account of the complexities and relationships that contributed to the 
Second Congo War being one of the most devastating conflicts since the end of World War II. 
12 According to Stearns’s research, Kabila’s army was comprised of Angolan, Chadian, Namibian, 
and Zimbabwean troops, with Sudan maintaining a tertiary role. This force was augmented by a 
myriad of militias from various parts of the Continent, many with ulterior motives, grudges, and 
rivalries that helped fuel the conflict. 
13 Ibid, P. 279. 
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Certain limitations were placed on this research, the most paramount being 
distance. Almost 8,000 miles lies in between and this proves a deciding challenge. For this 
reason, research cannot be conducted on the ground in the given state, but must be 
conducted through an analysis of official documents along with relevant research.  
Chapter Outline 
 
Moving forward, it is the intent of this introduction to not only lay the foundation for the 
concepts and processes to be discussed throughout, but to also convey that democracy is 
beginning to consolidate in various degrees, even in the face of repression. The chapters to 
follow will help illustrate who some of these opposition parties are and how well they 
follow democratic ideals, as they are theoretically governments in waiting. When facing 
authoritarian state mechanisms, opposition parties can’t afford the luxury of infighting and 
fracturing. This thesis will try to determine that if the level of adherence to internal 
democratic values and practices (intra-party democracy) goes down within an 
organization, the level of disaffection that party grows, causing a splintering effect for the 
party.  
 The following chapter will be the conceptual framework that underpins this thesis. 
The places, units, and critical concepts that will be dealt with will be discussed in greater 
detail there. The third chapter of this study will be a brief historical section of the case 
states involved. This is not intended to be a comprehensive examination of the colonial 
experience of Southern Africa, but a concise historical analysis of Angola, South Africa, and 
Zimbabwe. It will focus on the late-colonial-pre-independence, liberation, and post-
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colonial-independence period of the case states, and their history in the SADC. The fourth 
chapter will discuss the relevant history of the opposition political parties previously 
mentioned: UNITA, the ANC, and the MDC.  
 The fifth chapter will discuss the first two critical components of intra-party 
democracy, the political environment the parties inhabit, and the legal framework of the 
state and the party. The environment a party inhabits can have a profound effect on its 
behavior. The nature of the party system, coupled with the nature of the electoral system, 
can either encourage democratic consolidation, or severely hinder it. An important 
component of the environment in authoritarian states is the overall effectiveness of the 
parliament, and whether the opposition party can make use of its structural resources. 
 The legal framework of both the states and the parties also serves as a significant 
area for analysis. Most political parties in the modern era operate constitutionally. Meaning 
that they have a documented structure for the party that enumerates, in writing, their 
goals, functions, duties, and restrictions. They may also have by-laws, regulations, and 
manifestos that detail their behavior. Crucial though are the case state’s laws regarding 
political parties and their activities. 
The sixth chapter will assess the other elements of intra-party democracy, party 
inclusiveness and party economics. The overall inclusiveness of a party will try to measure 
a party’s engagement with grassroots elements. One of the most critical factors of 
inclusiveness is the level of centralization within the party, and whether there is party 
oversight of the leadership, as well as competitive elections for leadership positions. Given 
 13 
the SADC’s push for gender equality, women’s representation in the party and in positions 
of power becomes a critical question.  
Party economics is important to understanding how effective a party is at 
challenging state power nationally, and also whether the money is guarded and distributed 
by an oligarchic elite that may be loath to spread the economic fortunes of the party more 
equitably. When discussing the politics of Southern Africa however, ethnic rivalries and 
tensions can enter the equation. Therefore, it’s important to look at the distribution of 
economic resources across ethnic lines, since a truly democratic party would not encourage 
ethnic cleavages.  
The seventh and final chapter will be a conclusion that will summarize the 
knowledge gained throughout to see if, in fact, authoritarian political culture does have an 
impact on political parties in the case states. It will also discuss policy recommendations 
that parties may be in need of considering the data. The conclusion may find many 
challenges ahead for political parties and states alike, but it may also hope to show that the 
stereotypes of Africa must be penetrated to see that the continent, or at least many parts of 








Before moving on, it is important to first establish and clarify some of the key concepts and 
institutions this thesis is concerned with. We first turn to the geographic region in which 
this study will focus on, the Southern African region that encapsulates the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC). The SADC is a fifteen member inter-governmental 
organization that stretches as far north as the Democratic Republic of Congo to the Cape of 
South Africa, while pinned between the Atlantic and Pacific Ocean, and also includes 
Madagascar. The aim of the Southern African Development Community is to “achieve 
development, peace and security, and economic growth, to alleviate poverty, enhance the 
standard and quality of life of the peoples of Southern Africa, and support the socially 
disadvantaged through regional integration, built on democratic principles and equitable 
and sustainable development.”1 In 1992, the forerunner to the SADC, The Southern African 
Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC), consolidated the loose economic 
affiliation of states and began the process of becoming an institution for political and social 
development, in addition to the economic mandate, and bound the states by law through a 
treaty, thus creating the current SADC.2 
                                                        
1 The website of the SADC. “About-SADC.” Overview. 
2 Much of the relevant history and evolution of the SADC can be found in great detail at their official 
website, www.SADC.int. 
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The concept of intra-party democracy is fundamental to answering the questions 
posed. The literature on democracy has illustrated in great detail the functions of 
democracy. Khabele Matlosa offers the following elements of a liberal democracy: 
• Meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and organized groups for 
all positions of government power, at regular intervals, and excluding the use of 
force. 
• A highly inclusive level of participation in the selection of leaders and policies, 
through fair and regular elections, excluding no social group. 
• Civil and political liberties including; freedom of expression, freedom of press, and 
freedom to form and join organizations, among others.3  
What does this mean for intra-party democracy? Many of the conditions that are required 
to make democracy effective, like those listed above, can be extrapolated to form a basis for 
what may constitute intra-party democracy. As of right now, there exists no consensus on a 
structured definition of intra-party democracy among scholars, but as Jereon Mimpen 
points out, “many scholars agree on some basic principles of electivity, accountability, 
transparency, inclusivity, participation, and representation.”4 One could also add the level 
of tolerance a political party exhibits to that list, and also how accommodating of divergent 
viewpoints they are. Even though a consensus does not exist, the guidelines generated help 
to conceptualize how to think of intra-party democracy. Found in Magolowondo’s study, 
                                                        
3 Khabele Matlosa. 2007. Political Parties in Southern Africa: The State of Parties and their Role in 
Democratization. Stockholm. International IDEA. P. 33. 
4 Jereon Miapen. 2007. Intra-party Democracy and its Discontents: Democratization in a Volatile 
Landscape. NIMD. P. 2. 
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the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD) provides four indicators to 
gauge the level of intra-party democracy within a political party: 
• Is the party functioning according to the established rules and procedures? 
• Is decision making democratic and based on party statutes and current laws? 
• Is there meaningful decentralization of the party’s economic resources? 
• Can the rank-and-file (ordinary members at the lowest level of the party hierarchy) 
exercise oversight over the party leadership?5 
This provides a starting point for measuring intra-party democracy, but it is only 
generalized. When assessing intra-party democracy, other specific areas must be explored. 
These areas include, but certainly are not limited to; the environment the political parties 
inhabit; the legal framework of the party and the state in which that party resides in, 
including informal rules; the overall inclusiveness of the party, with regards to women and 
minorities; and the economic distribution of the party.  
It is import to discuss the units to be observed, political parties, and distinguish 
them from interests groups and other social movements. Although interests groups, like 
political parties, do form to represent a certain group and aggregate that group’s interest, 
they do not share critical idiosyncrasies that political parties possess. Heywood outlines 
four characteristics that distinguish a political party from an interest group: 
• Aim to exercise government power by winning political office; 
• Are organized bodies with a formal “card-carrying” membership;  
                                                        
5 Magolowondo. Understanding Intra-party Democracy in Africa: Issues and Questions. P. 4. 
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• Typically adopt a broad issue focus, addressing each of the major areas of 
government policy; 
• Are united to various degrees by shared political preferences and a general 
ideological identity.6 
While Mohamed Salih identifies four major functions that political parties engage in: 
• They endow regimes with legitimacy by providing ideologies, leadership, or 
opportunities for political participation, or a combination of all three; 
• They act as a medium for political recruitment, thus creating opportunities for 
upward social mobility;  
• Interest aggregation;  
• Provide for political stability in societies that are able to absorb increasing levels of 
political participation.7  
Many political parties in Africa can be further distinguished by their origins as 
national liberation movements that developed for different reasons others than traditional 
political parties, which will be explained in the historical analysis. National liberation 
movements had the primary goal of replacing white minority rule with African majority 
rule in their state through armed struggle.8 After independence, liberation movements 
would have to make a difficult transition to political party to maintain relevance. In the 
Political Parties Programme Handbook, it is argued “political parties play a crucial role in 
                                                        
6 Heywood. Politics. P. 248. 
7 Salih M. Mohamed. 2001. African Democracies and African Politics. P. 34. 
8 Martin Meredith. 2005. The Fate of Africa. New York. Public Affairs. P. 320-322. This is exemplified 
in the Zimbabwean Liberation War. 
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democracy-building.”9 Keeping that in mind, in developing democracies, democratic 
consolidation and democratization is still taking place, and it is important for political 
parties to help foster that process by striving to achieve the goals and functions of a 
democratic political party, and not inhibit it through short-term advantages and goals. For 
as Alycia Kellman, quoted from Matlosa’s study, points out, “if political parties fail in this 
role, true democracy has little chance of surviving.”10 
The type of political party system a state employs also has a significant impression 
on the nature and behavior of parties. There exist a few varieties of systems states can 
utilize, including: a one-party system, a multiparty system, and a dominant party system. 
Swaziland is the only SADC country that operates a no-party system. A one party system 
can be classified as a system in which only one party is tolerated, if not legally mandated as 
the exclusive party of the state. The use of intimidation and violence against those seen to 
oppose the ruling party typically characterizes these types of states. In fact, so pervasive is 
the oppression of any dissenting views in some states that ruling parties often become 
synonymous with the state itself. A multiparty system is one in which all the political 
parties of a given state are given an equal chance at competing and assuming power. 
Somewhere in the middle lies the dominant party system. A dominant party system can be 
characterized by “long, uninterrupted periods of electoral dominance by a single party, as 
                                                        
9 Matlosa and Victor Shale. 2006. Political Parties Programme Handbook. Johannesburg. EISA. P. 3. 
10 This information is found in Alycia Kellman’s 2004 Democracy Assistance in Practice: The 
Designing of a Political Party Training Program in the Republic of Kenya. Quoted in Matlosa’s 2007 
Political Parties in Southern Africa. P. 10. 
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well as being dominant in forming governments and determining the public agenda.”11 The 
key difference between a one-party system and that of a dominant party system is that 
opposition parties and dissenting perspectives are, with a few exceptions, tolerated and 
encouraged as an integral part of democratization in the latter.12 
 Another important factor contributing to political party behavior and structure is 
the electoral system utilized for the choosing of leaders and members of parliament (MP), 
at the state and party level. There is a plethora of research on electoral systems, whose 
functions include: 
• Providing a routine mechanism for recruiting and selecting individuals who will 
occupy seats in representative institutions; 
• Provide for orderly succession of governments; 
• Provide for periodic review of government’s record; 
• Provides government with a popular mandate, or legitimacy.13 
                                                        
11 Matlosa. Political Parties in Southern Africa: The State of Parties and their Role in Democratization. 
P. 34. 
12 In Party Systems in the SADC Region: In Defense of the Dominant Party System, Shumbana Karume 
highlights some of the features that distinguishes a dominant party system from other political 
systems, while making the argument that dominant parties can provide stability in an otherwise 
volatile political landscape to allow democratic consolidation to take place. 
13 This information is found in Jackson and Jackson’s 1997 A Comparative Introduction to Political 
Science, quoted in Matlosa’s 2003 Electoral System Reform, Democracy, and Stability in the SADC 
Region: A Comparative Analysis. P. 14-15. 
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Many of these features can be applied to party elections. For the purpose of this study, the 
two electoral systems of concern are the First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) and the Proportional 
Representation (PR) systems. 
 The FPTP system is typically known to provide a political system with stability. In 
this system, multiple candidates compete for the single representative position of that 
constituency. Yet, candidates can win with a plurality, the most votes as opposed to the 
majority vote (51%), producing the phenomenon of the wasted vote.14 Other features of 
the FPTP system include: 
• Relatively equal constituencies, for which there is only one representative; 
• Candidates run as individuals, not political parties; 
• Advantages dominant parties; 
• Marginalizes smaller parties.15  
The FPTP system can certainly dampen minority and specific policy voices, while PR on the 
other hand can provide a more equitable platform for various groups to influence policy. 
Alternatively, the PR system elects a parliament or national assembly based on the 
percentage of votes a party earns. Some of the main features of the PR system are: 
• Entire country one single constituency; 
                                                        
14 Matlosa. Electoral System Reform, Democracy, and Stability in the SADC Region: A Comparative 
Analysis. P. 21. The wasted vote, as defined here, is the occurrence of a large part of the 
electorate’s vote not factoring into the outcome. Issues concerning legitimacy can arise from this 
occurrence. 
15 Ibid. P. 20-26. 
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• Candidates do not contest elections as individuals, but party candidates on a 
predetermined list; 
• After elections, MPs are accountable to party rather than voters; 
• PR more inclusive and fairly representative.16  
The second feature on this list highlights a version of PR that will be relevant to this study; 
party-list PR. This variant of PR has voters elect an entire list of candidates, compiled and 
presented by a party, that will then go on to represent the party in parliament based on 
that party’s share of the vote.17 No system is perfect, however, and the fact that MPs are 
accountable mainly to the party presents challenges for accountability. For the duration of 







                                                        
16 Ibid. P. 27-30. 
17 Ibid. P. 27. Matlosa describes PR as an opinion-based electoral system, in which “voter choice is 
not restricted and determined by geographically confined electoral zones, but rather is driven by 





It is virtually inconceivable to discuss any processes taking place in Africa without first 
exploring and understanding its history and the precarious conditions that were a result of 
a European colonial legacy. European colonial engagement with the Continent began in the 
mid-15th century, and would eventually increase to feed the North Atlantic Slave Trade. 
However, systematic colonial subjugation of the natives throughout the Continent did not 
begin to take shape until after the Berlin Conference, which concluded in 1885.1 Known as 
the “Scramble for Africa”, the overall outcome of this conference was the partitioning of 
Africa for easier consumption by those countries in attendance.  
 The colonial history of Africa has been covered extensively in other literature. 
Therefore, for the needs of this thesis, we are concerned with only the histories of the case 
states of Angola, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. This historical analysis will strive to show 
why liberation movements, and not political parties, initially developed in the case states, 
with the exception of the quite young Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The 
emergence of independence was a very uneven process on the Continent, with different 
regions achieving it at various times throughout the late 20th century, and with varying 
methods. In West Africa, political parties developed as a natural progression of their 
                                                        
1 Held in two sessions in 1884 and 1885, the Berlin/Congo Conference, organized by Germany’s 
first chancellor Otto von Bismarck, was called to avert war between the ever-encroaching colonial 
powers. It was here that the European powers of the day established the rules for successfully 
claiming a colony on the Continent. 
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political experience with the colonial power. For example, the Nigerian National 
Democratic Party (NNDP) was created in 1923, the first political party in Nigeria as a result 
of the Clifford Constitution.2 The consultative political space this afforded, regardless of its 
limits, provided political organizations in Nigeria a stepping-stone that would eventually 
lead to independence in 1960. This was not to be the case for many Southern African states. 
Armed liberation movements, as the next two chapters will argue, formed primarily 
because of the perception and reality that negotiating with the colonial power was 
producing only more repression. In other words, liberation movements had reached a 
point of last resort those parties like the NNDP did not identify with due to their ability to 
petition their colonizers. Along with this, the purpose of this chapter is to illustrate how 
state history informs and influences political parties’ current self-identification, structure, 
and juxtaposition within their respective societies.  
Angola 
 
Located on the southwest coast of the Continent, north of Namibia and just south of the 
DRC, Angola has one of the most extensive colonial histories largely due to its proximity to 
the Atlantic Ocean and Europeans seeking a direct route to India. Portuguese expatriates 
began settling Angola in 1482, and would eventually become one of the thriving centers of 
the North Atlantic Slave Trade. So active was the slave trade in Angola that by 1836 when 
                                                        
2 Richard L. Sklar. 1963. Nigerian Political Parties: Power In an Emergent African Nation. Princeton. 
Princeton University Press. P. 46. The Clifford Constitution “conferred the right of franchise on a 
restricted Lagos electorate (about 3,000 male taxpayers with an income of £100) to return three 
members to the Legislative Council every five years.” Ibid.  
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the Portuguese outlawed slavery, an estimated three to four million Africans had been sold 
into slavery.3 
 Much of the relevant history needed to understand Angola today, and by extension 
UNITA, occurred in the latter half of the 20th Century. The end of World War II left many, if 
not all, of the major European powers in shambles. This meant that they were hardly in a 
place to maintain the integrity of their colonies through military supremacy. Couple this 
with the vociferous wave of nationalism that spread throughout Africa during the 1950s, 
and it becomes clear that the end of colonialism, at least politically, was inevitable.4 
 It was during this period of African nationalism that the first resistance groups in 
Angola begin to appear.  The first was the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola 
(MPLA) (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola), founded by Dr. Agostinho Neto 
in 1956, followed by the União das Populações de Angola (UPA), which eventually changed 
its name to the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA) (National Front for the 
Liberation of Angola). Holden Roberto founded this latter organization in 1957. The final 
insurgency group to appear, and one integral to this study, was that of the União Nacional 
para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA). UNITA was founded in 1966 by Jonas 
                                                        
3 W. James makes note of this in his Historical Dictionary of Angola. He also points out that though 
the Portuguese outlawed slavery in 1836, the trade did not actually end until 1865 when the 
British Royal Navy enforced its abolition, making the true number of Angolan slaves sold 
impossible to know. 
4 In Key Concepts in Politics, Heywood defines nationalism as the belief that people are split into 
distinct nations, and that the nation-state is the preeminent way to organize society politically. 
This ideal envisions nation-states as equal and entitled to govern internally without interference, 
and provided African leaders with a strong ideology to mobilize the people. 
 25 
Savimbi, who himself was a former minister in Holden Roberto’s government-in-exile, but 
left to form UNITA due to Roberto’s cronyism and unwillingness to share power.5 
 Though many African colonies achieved independence in the 1960s, Portugal settled 
into a protracted conflict with the various nationalist groups. Portugal was a relatively poor 
country compared to the other European colonial powers, and was loathe to relinquish its 
grasp on a lucrative holding, and refused to negotiate with the insurgents. In 1974, 
however, the Armed Forces Movement (MFA) of Portugal staged a coup and deposed the 
government there. It subsequently announced that Portugal would be ending its colonial 
adventure in Africa, and would in the near future grant independence to its colonies, 
among them Angola. The date for Angolan independence had been set for 11 November 
1975, but there remained high levels of animosity between the three liberation groups. For 
Savimbi’s part, he believed that “the MPLA was too non-African and mestiço/assimilado 
dominated, while the FNLA was too northern-oriented.”6 Representatives of the three 
movements met in the capital Luanda, located on the northwest coast, to prepare for 
independence. But the divisions proved insurmountable, and soon fighting broke out that 
caused Roberto and Savimbi to leave the capital and rendezvous with their respective 
armies. This convergence of dynamics would assure a seamless transition from a colonial 
war to a civil war.  
                                                        
5 W. Martin James. 2004. Historical Dictionary of Angola. Oxford. Scarecrow Press. P. xlvi. 
6 Ibid. P. xlvi. Mestiço is a Portuguese reference to those of mixed African and Portuguese origins, 
while assimilados refers to those Africans that are perceived to have rejected their African culture 
in exchange for paths to upward social mobility, i.e.: education, positions in the colonial 
government, etc. 
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 With its headquarters and its largest support base located in the capital, the MPLA 
was perfectly placed to assume power upon independence. And so, on 10th November, a 
day before the Portuguese High Commissioner would transfer power, a full-scale assault 
was launched on Luanda. Roberto’s FNLA would storm from the north through the 
Quifangondo plain backed by Zairian troops supplied by Mobutu, while Savimbi’s UNITA 
assaulted from the south, themselves backed by South African Defense Forces (SADF).7 
These forces were repelled by the MPLA due to the help of the impeccably timed Cubans, 
who sent “a special forces battalion [that] was flown into Luanda, arriving just in time to 
take up positions with MPLA forces.”8 The support from the Cubans had a profound impact 
on the nature of the conflict, as will be discussed shortly. This battle would effectively 
reduce the FNLA to a state of shambles from which they would never recover, but UNITA 
would endure through guerrilla tactics and mobilization of the peasantry. For the better 
part of the next thirty years Angola would be in a perpetual state of war. 
 The Angolan civil war developed significant international dimensions in addition to 
Cuban and South African involvement. The MPLA had received “12,000 Cubans and over 
$200 million worth of Soviet weaponry” in support.9 UNITA too received support from the 
United States in the form of “$15 million in military aid, including ground-to-air missiles”, 
                                                        
7 Martin Meredith. 2005. The Fate of Africa. New York. Public Affairs. P. 318. 
8 Ibid. P. 318. 
9 James. Historical Dictionary of Angola. P. xlviii. 
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while noting that aid doubled in three years.10 Angola would soon become a dangerous 
proxy battleground for the major Cold War powers. The war would continue episodically 
throughout different parts of the country, interrupted by a ceasefire in 1991 that lasted for 
18 months, and a peace accord in 1994 that lasted for four years. War broke out again in 
1998, but with the end of the Cold War and a lack of interest in sustaining any more 
conflict, most were ready for an end.11 
 The formal end to the conflict came in 2002 when government forces ambushed 
Savimbi’s unit near the Zambian boarder, killing Savimbi in the strike. With the death of the 
only leader it had ever known in almost 40 years, UNITA was in disarray and “within days, 
[they] sued for peace.”12 Since then, Angola has been on the path to healing itself after 
years of strife, using the capital generated from lucrative oil deposits and extensive 
diamond fields to encourage development. But all have not enjoyed the fruits of 
development and political power. The long military conflict resulted in weak political 
institutions with one-party tendencies, and low efficiency. But democratic consolidation 
has taken place, though shaky at times, and political space has opened up for parties like 
UNITA and others to contest power in a fairly peaceful manner.  
                                                        
10 Arthur S Banks, Thomas C. Muller, and William R. Overstreet, eds. 2007. Political Handbook of 
Africa 2007. Washington. CQ Press. P. 63. 
11 According to James, even though a government of national unity (GNU) established in 1997 
included UNITA ministers, Savimbi was reluctant to concede any of the territory or power he had 
acquired, thus making him a major obstacle to the peace process. 




Much like the Angolans to the north, the ethnic groups of Southern Africa experienced early 
exposure to European explorers.13 As a result of the Napoleonic Wars in the early 19th 
Century, the Cape Colony came into British possession. South Africa, like many other 
colonies on the Continent, would be found to have great deposits of mineral wealth; chief of 
which were gold and diamonds. This made the interior independent Boer republics of 
Transvaal and Orange Free State very attractive to the British. 
The Anglo-Boer War lasted from 1899-1902, ending with the British in near 
complete possession of Southern Africa. Along with the Cape and Natal, these regions came 
together to form the Union of South Africa.14 The British would grant South Africa full 
independence in 1931, but relations were strained between the two due to “widespread 
anti-British sentiment and racial preoccupations.”15 The modern shape of South Africa 
would begin to emerge in the 1940s with the nomination of the conservative National Party 
(NP), whose platform was institutional separation of the races.16  
                                                        
13 The Political Handbook of Africa states that Dutch settlers, known as Boers, appeared in the 
region in the 17th Century. The descendents of these Dutch and French Huguenots are known 
today as Afrikaners. 
14 Natal was annexed in 1843 by the British. The Union of South Africa was subsequently 
established in 1910. 
15 Banks, Muller, and Overstreet, eds. Political Handbook of Africa 2007. P. 803. 
16 Ibid. P. 803. 
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The NP would over the next several decades introduce and implement a series of 
legislative acts aimed at segregating the African population from the white population, the 
most overt of which was their “Bantustan” policy that envisioned uprooting millions of 
Africans and resettling them on rural “homelands”. The policy known as Apartheid 
systematically proliferated the legal landscape, leaving Africans “barred by law from skilled 
work, from forming registered unions, and from taking strike action.17  
The NP government tolerated no dissension among the African population. When 
Nelson Mandela and other top officials in the ANC were convicted of crimes against the 
state and sentenced to life imprisonment, it left the ANC scrambling and in near ruin.18 As 
Apartheid was established throughout society, the oppressive and indomitable apparatus 
of the state suppressed any challenge to the current status. The years following the ANC’s 
retreat into exile left a new generation of Africans to be “reduced to an obliging shell, [the 
African] looks at awe at the white power structure and accepts what he regards as the 
‘inevitable position’.”19 
By the 1970s, the South African government had considerable power, but the Black 
Consciousness Movements in the early part of the decade helped to reinvigorate African 
descent against Apartheid. Change in Angola and Mozambique brought nationalist 
                                                        
17 Meredith.  The Fate of Africa. P. 416. 
18 Ibid. P. 124-127. 
19 Ibid. P. 418. These were the words of Steve Biko, leader and martyr of the Black Consciousness 
Movements of the 1970s. He would die from injures sustained by the South African police forces 
at the age of 30. 
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governments to power there, to be followed by Zimbabwe in 1980, under Robert Mugabe 
and his Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF).20 This led to South 
Africa being buffeted on all sides by states fully unsympathetic to the NP’s racist regime, 
especially considering how the SADF was given to meddling in their domestic affairs.21 
South Africa received international condemnation not only for the blight of Apartheid, but 
also their unwillingness to release control of South West Africa, subsequently known as 
Namibia. 
These conditions, combined with the flight of foreign capital and a quasi-reform 
minded white community, sounded the death knell for Apartheid. The 1980s saw a 
relaxation of Apartheid laws, including a repeal of the universally loathed pass laws, which 
required Africans to possess the necessary documentation to travel in white districts, as 
well as repealing “bans on multiracial political parties and interracial sex and marriage.”22 
Yet, at the same time the government applied more pressure than ever to dissidents, while 
fighting a dirty guerrilla war with the ANC.23 
                                                        
20 Ibid. P. 425. 
21 Historically, the SADF was known to have assisted UNITA troops in Angola in exchange for the 
ability to assault South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO) bases located there. The 
SADF also assisted Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) guerrillas in Mozambique, and 
harried nationalist movements in Rhodesia. 
22 Leonard Thompson. 2000. A History of South Africa. New Haven, CT. Yale University Press. P. 
226-227. 
23 According to Meredith, a war of assassinations, bombings, and military assaults persisted 
throughout the 80s, in which both sides committed atrocities. 
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 By the end of the 1980s, South Africa was starting to feel the negative impact of 
being a pariah state. With the election of a new administration to the NP government under 
Prime Minister Frederick de Klerk, whom Meredith describes as pragmatic above all else, 
negotiations were initiated with Mandela and other members of the ANC’s leadership cadre 
that would eventually lead to the reinstatement of political parties like the ANC, the 
creation of a new constitution, and the release of Mandela and other political prisoners.24 
The new constitution called for “one-person, one-vote” across the nation, and in the run up 
to the 1994 elections many of the laws that formulated Apartheid were repealed. The 
election saw Mandela chosen for President, and South Africa embark on a new era.  
 Since the tumultuous times of the Apartheid era, South Africa has managed to 
rebuild itself into a regional power with a resurgent economy. South Africa is a member of 
the BRICS, which is a group of the top developing economies in the world. The Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC), which was created “to investigate human rights abuses 
and political crimes of the Apartheid era with the aim of consigning their legacy to history”, 
helped many South Africans come to grips with the horrors of that time.25 Current 
concerns for South Africa include land distribution, a common issue among African states, 
and the human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome 
(HIV/AIDS) epidemic, of which some 11% of South Africans are infected.26 These issues 
                                                        
24 Meredith. The Fate of Africa. P. 434-440. 
25 Banks, Muller, and Overstreet, eds. Political Handbook of Africa 2007. P. 810. 
26 Ibid. P. 817. 
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aside, South Africa has become a ringing example of what an African nation can achieve, 
even after so much unrest, with perseverance and tolerance. 
Zimbabwe 
 
Encompassed by South Africa, Botswana, Zambia, and Mozambique, Zimbabwe lies near 
the heart of Southern Africa. Like many of its neighbors, Zimbabwe, formerly known as 
Rhodesia, has a rich history of nationalist movements resistant to an authoritarian white 
minority. It too contains mineral wealth in the form of diamonds and gold, but not quite to 
the extent of that of other countries. Traditionally, Zimbabwe’s economic strength lay in 
agriculture, with around 70% of the arable land used for cash-crop production at one 
point.27 Zimbabwe’s history can be partitioned into three distinct periods: the colonial 
period, the liberation war period, and the post-independence period dominated by the 33 
year rule of Robert Mugabe and his ZANU-PF party. 
 The British South Africa Company established the colony of Rhodesia in the late 19th 
Century under the leadership of Cecil Rhodes, for which the colony was named. Rhodesia 
subsequently became a colony of the British in 1923, but reserved the right to self-
government. The white minority government, like South Africa, was intent on precluding 
majority rule, and would establish ‘homelands’ over the next three decades with “more 
than half a million Africans [being] uprooted from their homes on land designated to be in 
                                                        
27 Ibid. P. 950. 
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‘white’ areas.”28 This would help institute a dominant edifice of white superiority that 
would only begin to be challenged in the 1950s by the wave of nationalism engulfing the 
Continent. 
 The initial liberation movements in Rhodesia had a very moderate stance, but the 
state did not discriminate from moderate or radical, any dissension was dealt with harshly. 
The tepid position of these early movements led to the formation of the more radical 
Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) in 1961, which sought many basic rights, chief 
among them was majority rule. Lack of leadership on the part of Joshua Nkomo left ZAPU in 
disarray, and in 1963 the party would split, with Mugabe and other ZAPU leaders forming 
ZANU. The split would form into a feud that would cascade into intermittent domestic 
warfare.29 The rift in the party also exposed an ethnic cleavage between the two parties, 
with Nkomo’s ZAPU consisting primarily of Ndebele located in the south of the country, 
while Mugabe’s ZANU was compiled of mostly Shona from the north.30 Regardless of their 
differences, both groups agreed that an armed liberation struggle was necessary to free 
Zimbabwe. 
 Fearing Britain would grant majority rule as it did with its West African colonies like 
Nigeria, the highly conservative Rhodesian Front (RF) government under Ian Smith signed 
                                                        
28 Meredith. The Fate of Africa. P. 128. 
29 Ibid. P. 131. 
30 This ethnic divide was also evident in both party’s military wings: Mugabe’s Zimbabwe Africa 
National Liberation Army (ZANLA), and Nkomo’s Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army 
(ZIPRA). 
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the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965, formally cutting ties with the 
British and concomitantly isolating Rhodesia. The intransigent position of the RF in regards 
to the nationalists would ensure a brutal guerrilla campaign that would last for over a 
decade and claim almost 20,000 lives.31 With international pressure being applied to each 
belligerent, negotiations were again entered into in London, and the Lancaster House 
Agreement was decided upon. The agreement would guarantee majority rule and 
stipulated elections to be held, which Mugabe and what was now known as ZANU-PF would 
handily win. The Republic of Zimbabwe was declared on 18 April 1980.  
 Mugabe surprised many of his critics with his reconciliatory attitude after 
independence, considering many Rhodesians had been taught to fear and loathe him. 
Mugabe reassured the white community that he understood their concerns and ensured 
that Zimbabwe was fair to all its citizens.32 The attitude of cooperation and compromise 
the white community received from Mugabe though was unfortunately not enjoyed by his 
rivals, Nkomo and ZAPU. In 1982, Mugabe began implementing his plan to achieve his 
vision of Zimbabwe as a one-party state. Accusing Nkomo and ZAPU of plotting to 
overthrow the government, Mugabe deployed the 5 Brigade, an elite military unit trained 
by North Korean specialists, to ZAPU’s support base located in Matabeleland in the south. 
For the population of Matabeleland, the Gukurahundi, chiShona for the rain that blows 
                                                        
31 Meredith. The Fate of Africa. P. 325. 
32 Meredith notes that after independence Mugabe retained many Rhodesian military personnel, 
courted the white business community to allay their fears, and even hosted friendly meetings 
with Ian Smith, his former enemy. 
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away the chaff before the spring rains, was to be a campaign of terror in which 5 Brigade 
employed tactics such as “beatings, arson, and mass murder.”33 History would show the 
threat of insurgency to be merely a pretense to unleash politically motivated violence 
against ZAPU and destroy their power base, essentially eliminating them as a viable 
political party. In order to put an end to the violence, Nkomo signed the 1987 Unity Accord, 
which merged ZAPU and ZANU-PF, effectively making Zimbabwe a de facto one-party state. 
 Mugabe’s rule would ensure no significant opposition to ZANU-PF and its 
government for over a decade. ZANU-PF’s corruption throughout the 1990s contributed to 
the growing discontent among citizens. Instead of being parceled out to poor farmers, land, 
always a crux in Zimbabwean conflict, was “redistributed to high-ranking government 
officials, army officers, and judges with ties to ZANU-PF.”34 By the end of the 1990s the 
land issue, along with high levels of government corruption, had produced a maladroit 
economy. Mass discontent led to the formation in 1999 of Zimbabwe’s first robust 
opposition party in over a decade, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Mugabe 
called for a draft constitution to assuage the populace, but as Meredith’s analysis points 
out, the draft left in place “the vast powers and patronage that Mugabe has acquired as 
president over twenty years.”35 Ultimately, this led to the draft being rejected. Furious, 
Mugabe blamed white business interests, believing it was the driving force behind the MDC. 
                                                        
33 Meredith. The Fate of Africa. P. 622. 
34 Banks, Muller, and Overstreet, eds. Political Handbook of Africa 2007. P. 959. 
35 Meredith. The Fate of Africa. P. 636. 
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In retaliation, Mugabe authorized a “fast-track” land program that targeted thousands of 
commercial farms. A final wave of land seizures in 2002 assured the collapse of commercial 
agriculture in Zimbabwe.36  
Zimbabwe has experienced pitched political battles between the MDC and ZANU-PF 
since then, with the latter relying on violence and intimidation to maintain power. The 
crisis in Zimbabwe has important implications for the stability of the SADC. In 2009 the 
SADC, with considerable effort on behalf of South Africa, brokered the Global Political 
Agreement (GPA) that would eventually implement a government of national unity (GNU) 
led by Mugabe and the heads of the two MDC factions, Morgan Tsvangarai and Arthur 
Mutambara. This political marriage has been rocky, with the threat of violence ready to 
spark at a moments notice. But this has also led to a dialogue developing between the main 










                                                        
36 Ibid. P. 645. 
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Chapter Four 
Case Party History 
 
Like the countries that produce them, many political parties in Africa too possess a complex 
and renowned narrative. Mentioned in the last chapter was the fact that a significant 
number of political parties operating on the Continent today are former liberation 
movements that championed the nationalist cause against European colonizers. The 
dichotomy between parties with liberation credentials and those parties without continues 
to influence the course of electoral politics, as will be illustrated later. As the cases of 
Angola and South Africa show, many parties today have a history that harmonizes with 
their respective state’s history, making the telling of one without the other impossible. It is 
the purpose of this chapter to discuss in further detail the relevant case history of the 
parties. This will provide a picture of the parties’ evolution, explain why they may behave a 
certain way or advocate certain policies, and gives a sense of trajectory of the organizations 
in question. 
The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) 
 
Jonas Savimbi, as noted earlier, formed the National Union for the Total Independence of 
Angola (UNITA) in 1966 from mainly Ovimbundu, Angola’s largest ethnic group, in the 
Central Highlands districts of Huambo and Bié.1 Savimbi had tired of Roberto’s 
domineering leadership while a minister in his government, and believing that the MPLA 
                                                        
1 Banks, Muller, and Overstreet, eds. Political Handbook of Africa 2007. P. 57, 65. 
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and the FNLA had failed, he decided to create his own organization.2 UNITA had a close 
proximity to the rural peasantry of Angola, while Savimbi had received political training in 
various socialist states. This meant that Maoism, an ideology whose central argument is 
that the source of a successful revolution is a peasantry educated in their political realities, 
would be the guiding principle for UNITA, at least in its early history.3 Like many African 
liberation movements, UNITA had a dual structure within the organization: UNITA proper 
composing the political wing, supplemented by the Forças Armadas de Libertação de 
Angola (FALA) (Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola), UNITA’s military wing. 
Operating in 17 of 18 Angolan provinces at its prime, Savimbi’s FALA was a world-
renowned guerrilla force, considered highly “disciplined, dedicated, and well 
commanded.”4  
 UNITA was a relatively marginal organization at the beginning of the civil conflict 
that ensued after the exit of the Portuguese at the advent of Angolan independence in 1975. 
Being unprepared for a protracted civil war, UNITA instead “retreated to the bush to fight 
what it saw as Soviet/Cuban imperialism.”5 With the assistance of the United States and 
South Africa, however, UNITA would be transformed into a formidable fighting force. 
Professing an anti-communist line throughout the Cold War in response to the 
                                                        
2 James. Historical Dictionary of Angola. P. 148. 
3 Ibid. P. 164. James notes that UNITA commanders “were ordered to respect tribal customs and 
leaders”, while Savimbi himself was regarded a local hero by many for his insistence on leading 
from the field. Ibid. 
4 Ibid. P. 56. 
5 Ibid. P. 164. 
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Soviet/Cuban backing of the MPLA, Savimbi made UNITA attractive to the West as a 
potential ally in a strategic region against Soviet expansion. The support received from the 
West and South Africa helped UNITA secure a large amount territory, including the 
diamond fields of the Lunda region.6 The help of an overtly racist regime in South Africa, 
along with their close relations with Washington, did not endear UNITA to many Africans. 
This would even cause tension within UNITA, but Savimbi was known to deal with 
dissention ruthlessly.7 
 The Angolan civil war raged until a peace was met with the Bicesse Accord 1991, but 
that peace soon fell through, and war resumed. Peace was brokered again with the signing 
of the Lusaka Protocol in 1994, which ushered in an uneasy peace for the next four years. 
As the new century approached, UNITA members had been selected to several 
governmental positions.8 In spite of this, Savimbi began moving troops into battle positions 
in 1998, setting the stage for a return to war. Savimbi’s perceived grab for power, and his 
consequent disrupting of the peace process caused a rift in UNITA that proved too much for 
even his charismatic personality to overcome, and led to the formation of UNITA-Renovada 
(UNITA-R) (UNITA-Renovation). From the beginning, UNITA-R never received much 
support from UNITA stalwarts who perceived it as merely a puppet for the MPLA 
                                                        
6 Meredith. The Fate of Africa. P. 608-609. Meredith’s analysis has UNITA’s diamond earnings 
estimated at $300-500 million annually. Much of it was reinvested back into the FALA via arms 
and equipment. 
7 Banks, Muller, and Overstreet, eds. Political Handbook of Africa 2007. P. 65. 
8 According to the Political Handbook of Africa, UNITA representatives were named to seven deputy 
ministerial positions, and four senior cabinet posts. 
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government.9 The split did reflect a real division in UNITA among moderates and 
hardliners, and even though there was a lack of support for UNITA-R, there was a growing 
concern that Savimbi was becoming a liability. 
 This liability was removed from the political landscape in 2002 when soldiers of the 
Armed Forces of Angola (FAA), Angola’s national army, ambushed Savimbi’s unit and killed 
him. This singular act had done much to bring an end to almost thirty years of conflict. 
UNITA and the MPLA government sued a rapid peace, and “in October, UNITA declared 
itself disarmed and became a democratic political party.”10 The Renovation faction would 
be incorporated back into UNITA, becoming again one entity, and dissolved FALA; 
completing their transformation into a democratic political party.11 UNITA enjoys being 
Angola’s largest opposition party, but that opposition is dwarfed by the MPLA. The road is 
arduous for UNITA as the Angolan state still bears many trappings of a one-party state. 
UNITA is currently attempting to establish a larger constituency outside of its traditional 
strongholds in southern Angola. The transition from liberation movement to political party 
for UNITA has not been without setbacks, and it remains to be seen how the political 
evolution of both UNITA and Angola will proceed. 
                                                        
9 James. Historical Dictionary of Angola. P. 165. 
10 Bereni Oruitemeka, and Alex Vines. 2009. “Beyond Bullets and Ballots: the Reintegration of 
UNITA in Angola.” In Reintegrating Armed Groups After Conflict: Politics, Violence and Transition. 
Mats Berdal and David H. Ucko. New York. Routledge. P. 205. 
11 Banks, Muller, and Overstreet, eds. Political Handbook of Africa 2007. P. 67. Here the figures 
indicate 5,000 UNITA soldiers were integrated into the FAA, with another 80,000 resuming their 
roles as citizens.  
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The African National Congress (ANC) 
 
The African National Congress (ANC) in many ways has been the standard-bearer of 
African nationalism, and its history is almost synonymous with modern South Africa’s 
political development. Despite one of the most turbulent political eras seen on the 
Continent, the ANC emerged in a position that many liberation movements-turned-political 
parties could only dream of. The forerunner to the ANC, the South African Native National 
Congress (SANNC), was established in 1912, making it not just the oldest political 
organization in Africa but one of the oldest in the world. Officially reconstituting itself as 
the ANC in 1923, it was initially composed of African elites from the middle class such as 
business leaders, doctors, lawyers, and ministers.12 This early ANC projected a very 
moderate stance in its approach to the growing racial division in South Africa. Lacking the 
radical zeal that it would later be known for, the ANC constantly sought a judicious solution 
to the racial question from an increasingly oppressive state, stopping short of requesting 
anything as radical as majority rule. For this, the ANC’s reputation suffered heavily, and by 
the end of the 1930s the ANC’s “country-wide membership was not much in excess of 
1,000.”13 
 The radicalization of the ANC over the 1940s correlates with the rise of Apartheid 
policies put forth by the National Party (NP). The industrial output during and after World 
                                                        
12 Saul Dubow. 2000. The African National Congress. UK. Sutton Publishing. P. 3. Dubow’s analysis 
reveals the influence of Booker T. Washington’s notion of coexistence on early ANC leaders, as 
well as being influenced by W.E.B. Du Bois. 
13 Ibid. P. 18. 
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War II meant that thousands of Africans were moving to the cities in search of better 
opportunities; a process known as urbanization. This greatly increased the ANC’s support, 
as it historically had an urban disposition, but also encouraged the government to be more 
proactive in its racial legislation. In its most radical publication to that date, the ANC’s 1943 
African Claims asserted the party’s nationalist commitment by calling for self-government, 
among other rights. African Claims is significant because it marks a departure from the 
ANC’s early conciliatory attitude and, “what had hitherto been polite requests now became 
demands.”14 The state would respond with systematic oppression, at which it was 
becoming increasingly adept. 
 The ascendency of the ANC Youth League, whose leadership cadre included a young 
Mandela, would culminate with the 1949 Programme of Action, and the ANC’s 
transformation into a truly radical Africanist liberation movement. The Programme of 
Action called for a level of rebelliousness not yet attempted, including “civil disobedience, 
boycotts and ‘stay-at-home’ strikes on a mass scale.”15 This would be followed by the 1952 
Defiance Campaign, which advised Africans to elicit arrests by not observing Apartheid 
laws in an effort to bury the system under so much bureaucratic fodder it would break. 
Break it did not, but over the course of the next five months more than 8,000 people were 
arrested, which helped catapult the ANC to the level of a mass movement.16  
                                                        
14 Ibid. P. 23. 
15 Meredith. The Fate of Africa. P. 119. 
16 Ibid. P. 119. 
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 In 1955, the NP government was confronted with the Freedom Charter, a bill of 
rights adopted by the Congress of the People, of which the ANC was a primary member.17 
The state issued its typical response. The pressures of social upheaval finally gave way in 
Sharpeville in 1960 when an anti-pass law protest ended with the police killings of 69 
people. With the threat of anarchy looming, the government banned the ANC and a number 
of other parties. The failure of mass strikes in 1961 would convince many in the ANC that 
the tactics of non-violence had bore all the fruit it could. Recognizing people’s 
disenfranchisement with civil disobedience that only produced more draconian measures 
from the state, Mandela formed the independent military organization Umkhonto we Sizwe 
(MK), or Spear of the Nation, which was essentially an operation between the ANC and the 
South African Communist Party (SACP).18  
 From the MK’s inception to the Rivonia trial that found Mandela and other ANC 
leaders guilty of treason, its campaign of sabotage had in reality accomplished little, and 
with the imprisonment of its impassioned leaders, the ANC ebbed, reducing it to a state of 
inconsequentiality.19 The ANC survived in exiled outpost in Africa and Europe for the next 
two decades. After securing bases in frontline states sympathetic to the its cause, the ANC 
began a guerrilla campaign that was more sophisticated and much more bold than the MK’s 
                                                        
17 Dubow. The African National Congress. P. 52. The Congress of the People was composed of 
virtually every oppressed group in South Africa, including the Indian Congress, the Coloured 
People’s Organization, and the Congress of Democrats. 
18 Meredith. The Fate of Africa. P. 124. 
19 Dubow. The African National Congress. P. 66, 70. 
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early attempts.20 The Black Consciousness Movement’s revival of popular opposition in the 
1970s-80s provided the ANC with the opportunity to reassert itself as the preeminent 
liberation group of South Africa. The ANC’s guerrilla campaign during this period led to a 
renewed interest in the organization, allowing it “to absorb a substantial proportion of the 
Black Consciousness Movement.”21  
 The 1990s brought with it vindication and triumph for the ANC, whom the 
electorate chose to govern the new Republic of South Africa.22 The ANC has shown its 
commitment to democracy through two peaceful transfers of power: Mandela being 
succeeded as party president by Thabo Mbeki in 1999, followed by Mbeki being succeeded 
by Jacob Zuma in 2009. The ANC is a member of the Tripartite Alliance with longtime 
political allies the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), and the SACP, which 
field their candidates on the ANC ticket. The history of the ANC working with disparate 
elements of society has greatly contributed to its legitimacy as South Africa’s most 
representative force. The ANC has had to be adaptive and receptive to new influences and 
ideas in order to survive. This has helped it cultivate a tolerant, compromising nature, 
enabling the ANC the ability to work with those it may fundamentally disagree with. 
Criticism has been leveled at the ANC, however, for complacency owing to the lack of any 
                                                        
20 According to Meredith, the ANC destroyed fuel deposits, attacked a nuclear power station, and 
used a car-bomb on a Pretoria military complex, killing sixteen. 
21 Dubow. The African National Congress. P. 84. 
22 See Chapter Three, sec. South Africa, for more details relating to South Africa’s history in the 
early 1990s. 
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challenging opposition in the state. Even so, many South Africans “believe that only the 
ANC has the interests of blacks at heart and are therefore prepared to overlook its 
deficiencies.”23  
The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) 
 
While the ANC represents the oldest political party in Africa, Zimbabwe’s Movement for 
Democratic Change (MDC) can be said to be one of Africa’s youngest, and the only party in 
this study that was not formerly a liberation movement. The rule of President Robert 
Mugabe since independence had brought Zimbabwe to the brink of political and economic 
disaster. Under the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), the 
economy was driven into disarray, with inflation reaching over a record-breaking 200 
million percent.24 Violence and intimidation permeated the political landscape. The courts, 
the military, and the security sector were all politicized in order to give ZANU-PF vast 
control over an increasingly authoritarian state apparatus. The signing of the Unity Accord 
by Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) ended national-scale opposition, while 
ensuing opposition movements were crushed ruthlessly. 
 It was in this tempestuous atmosphere in 1999 that the MDC was born. In response 
to an unpopular military adventure in the DRC and sweeping constitutional reforms put 
forth by ZANU-PF, the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), comprised of various 
                                                        
23 Banks, Muller, and Overstreet, eds. Political Handbook of Africa 2007. P. 820. 
24 The Economist. 2013. “Zimbabwe after Hyperinflation: In Dollars they Trust.” The Economist. 
April. 
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elements of civil society, was formed to express the people’s disagreement and campaign 
for reforms.25 In order to bolster its voice in the debate, the NCA aligned with the 
influential Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), then led by current Prime Minister 
Morgan Tsvangarai. Members of this alliance would eventually coalesce into a serious 
opposition party. As a result of people’s disillusionment with ZANU-PF, the MDC came to be 
represented by a wide swath of society, including “workers, students, middle-class 
intellectuals, civil rights activists, and white corporate executives.”26 The MDC rode a wave 
of support through the 2000 parliamentary elections, nearly unseating ZANU-PF with 47% 
of the vote, translating into 57 seats including those of the largest metropolitan areas, 
Bulawayo and the capital, Harare.27  
 The close call that was the 2000 elections would put ZANU-PF into a war footing. 
Mugabe himself barely fended off a challenge to the presidency from Tsvangarai in 2002, 
losing due to tactics of “intimidation, great delays at the polls, and almost-certain 
rigging.”28 ZANU-PF endeavored to remove Tsvangarai from the political scene with not 
one, but two trials for treason, only to be tossed out due to a lack of evidence. The MDC had 
a meteoric rise in Zimbabwean politics, yet there existed many fissures in the party, some 
                                                        
25 Stephen Chan. Citizen of Zimbabwe: Conversations with Morgan Tsvangarai. Harare, Zimbabwe. 
Sable Press. P. 14-15. The main goal of ZANU-PF’s reforms was to provide legitimacy to its highly 
controversial land redistribution program, but would have also installed Mugabe as Zimbabwean 
President for life, while further empowering him to dissolve parliament at will. 
26 Banks, Muller, and Overstreet, eds. Political Handbook of Africa 2007. P. 962. 
27 Meredith. The Fate of Africa. New York. Public Affairs. P. 639. 
28 Chan. Citizen of Zimbabwe: Conversations with Morgan Tsvangarai. P. 18. 
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which will be discussed later. The challenges would prove too insurmountable for the MDC. 
Although the decision of whether or not to contest the senatorial elections in 2005 was 
cited as the reason for the MDC split, in reality, the growing discontent of many party 
officials over Tsvangarai’s perceived lack of decisiveness appeared to be the primary 
cause.29 The split in the MDC included a class distinction, with Tsvangarai’s MDC-T (MCD- 
Tsvangarai) associated with labor, and Mutambara’s MDC-N (MDC-Ncube) representing an 
intellectual base.30 ZANU-PF, however, provided the glue that would keep the two factions 
in close alliance. 
 The 2008 harmonized elections, meaning coinciding parliamentary and presidential 
elections, proved to be another decisive battleground. The initial presidential vote had 
Tsvangarai over Mugabe by a narrow margin, though Chan’s estimate puts it closer 57%. In 
the wake of failed South African mediation, a run-off election was held that saw new 
heights in the intensity of violence, with Tsvangarai eventually sitting out in protest.31 
Fearing the violence could destabilize the region; the SADC facilitated the creation of the 
GNU, mentioned previously. 
 In 2013, both factions of the MDC are vigorous partners in the GNU. The relationship 
with ZANU-PF is contentious at best, and potentially explosive at the worst. All parties have 
agreed and adopted a new constitution that replaces the Lancaster Constitution. This has, 
                                                        
29 Ibid. P. 99. 
30 MDC-N is the current name of the breakaway faction, named for its founder and current 
president Welshman Ncube, former MDC secretary general. 
31 Chan. Citizen of Zimbabwe: Conversations with Morgan Tsvangarai. P. 102. 
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predictably, caused an inordinate amount of divisiveness and feuding, with the two MDC 
factions competing for dominance against one another, and ZANU-PF not truly committed 
to any democratic reforms that encroach on its power. Despite all this, the MDC has shown 
resiliency in its ability to survive in a dissonant political environment. Whatever the future 














Political Environment & Legal Framework 
 
The historical analysis has hopefully shown that political parties are at the center of state 
development and truly one of the cornerstones of democratization. Political parties provide 
an indispensible forum for individuals to come together in order aggregate and articulate 
diverse positions. It provides the system with legitimacy, with popular support for parties 
being integral to good governance. Opposition parties occupy a special place in the political 
landscape given their juxtaposition to the party in power. Opposition parties, ideally, 
provide the electorate with alternative policy platforms, distinctive strategies, but most 
importantly, a robust opposition party will keep a government fearing removal at elections 
accountable. All this and more opposition parties cannot accomplish with low, or 
decreasing levels of intra-party democracy. The prevailing opinion in Southern Africa is 
that opposition parties have “weak organization, low levels of institutionalization, and 
inadequate links to society.”1 Opposition parties need strong foundations to perform their 
required role, and implementation of intra-party democracy is essential to achieving this 
goal.  
This chapter will investigate the political system and its correlating legal 
framework. Both the national laws concerning political parties, and the regulations 
enshrined in the parties’ constitutions that establish the parties’ structures and ideals will 
                                                        
1 Wole Olaleye. 2003. Political Parties and Multi-party Elections in Southern Africa. SADC Insight IV. 
South Africa. 
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be the focus of the legal framework. The political environment will consist of the party 
system in question, as well as the electoral system utilized. 
UNITA 
 
The constitution of Angola establishes it as a multiparty democracy using party-list PR to 
elect the National Assembly representing 18 provinces. The individual that occupies the 
top spot on the winning party-list automatically becomes president of the state. In practice, 
however, the MPLA has been the dominant political force since independence.2 In function, 
Angola is effectively a one-party state. This has led to the National Assembly becoming 
subservient to the executive, thus rendering it an ineffective tool for UNITA MPs. Laws 
regulating political parties include Electoral Law 7/04, Electoral Registration Law 3/05, 
and Electoral Observation Law 4/05. Political Parties Law 2/05 has the most impact on the 
structure and functions of a party though. In it, there contains a provision for intra-party 
democracy that commits parties to: 
• Non-discriminatory access, namely, in function of race, sex, origin or religious 
preferences; 
• Approval of the party charter and programme by all members or by a representative 
assembly; 
                                                        
2 For 34 years, José Eduardo dos Santos has been president of both Angola and the ruling MPLA. In 
an interview with Chatham House, Isaias Samakuva, president of UNITA, informed them that dos 
Santos “controls the legislative, the executive and the judicial branches of the government, as well 
as the media and the electoral commission.” Isaias Samakuva. Interview by Alex Vines. April 29, 
2013. Change in Angola: The Role of UNITA. Transcript. Chatham House. London. 
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• Periodic election of the holders of the central and local party offices by all members 
or by a representative assembly.3  
Resolution no. 10/05 further establishes a code of conduct for elections and a party’s rights 
and responsibilities during them. The National Election Committee is an allegedly 
independent electoral body whose responsibilities include organizing elections, voter 
education, and determining polling stations, just to name a few.4  
 UNITA conforms to Angolan law by rooting its organizational foundation in a 
constitution, which states the “Any Angolan citizen over 18 who accepts the Programme 
and its By-laws and be in full enjoyment of their civil and political rights can be a member 
of UNITA.”5 Article 7 of UNITA’s Internal Regulations guarantees equal treatment 
regardless of social factors like race, sex, age, religion, etc. Members’ rights include: 
• Participation in the political life of the party; 
• Elect and be elected to party organs; 
• Enjoy the protection of the party; 
• Express your view, and vote on matters; 
• Acquire a party card.6  
While members’ duties include: 
                                                        
3 Republic of Angola. 2005. Political Parties Law 2/05. Art. 8.  
4 Republic of Angola. 2004. Electoral Law 7/04. Art. 155. Though the National Electoral Commission 
is established as an independent body in Art. 154, dos Santos and the MPLA hold considerable 
influence over it. 
5 UNITA. Estatutos. Art. 1. 
6 Ibid. Art. 8. 
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• Participating in an organ in your place of residence; 
• Pay party dues punctually and regularly; 
• Be loyal and respect the statutes, regulations, program, ideals, heritage and party 
organs; 
• Uncompromisingly defend the unity and internal cohesion of the party; 
• Contribute to the expansion of the party.7  
UNITA further projects its intentions through its policy positions: 
• Adhering seriously to the rule of law; committing without reservation to direct 
democratic elections for the president, the parliament and local governments; 
• Governing with all citizens who are qualified and competent regardless of their 
political affiliation; 
• Reversing the unemployment trend, addressing the pressing housing needs, 
healthcare, education and social security; 
• Fighting hunger and poverty; 
• Using current oil revenues to seriously diversify the economy; and 
• Guaranteeing equal opportunities for all.8  
 UNITA’s organizational structure is established in Article 17 of the UNITA 
Constitution, which consists of the major party bodies, the National Executive body, and the 
National Advisory bodies. The major party bodies responsible for guiding the party are the 
                                                        
7 Ibid. Art. 9. 
8 Domingos Jardo Muekalia. Interview by Alex Vines. July 30th, 2012. Angola’s 2012 Elections: The 
View from the Opposition. Transcript. Chatham House. London.  
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Congress, the Political Commission, and the Standing Committee. The Congress stands at 
the top as the supreme deliberative body, meeting every four years. At provincial 
conferences, delegates are chosen to attend the Congress. The Congress will elect the party 
president, as well as the Political Commission. An extensive list concerning elections for 
UNITA leadership positions is located in Article 11, some of which will be discussed later. 
UNITA employs two types of electoral systems for internal elections: PR for the election of 
its governing bodies, and a single-member majority system for the executive bodies. A 
single-member majority system means an executive candidate must achieve at least 51% of 
the vote in order to be elected. Either candidates themselves, or party organs can initiate 
nominations. Congress is also responsible for approving “statutes, guidelines, strategies, 
and programs; reports issued by various party organs; and the party symbols.”9 In order to 
be elected to the Political Commission and other leadership positions, members must have 
“15 years of membership, good behavior, no criminal record, paid their membership fees 
and carry a valid UNITA membership card.”10 The Political Commission is responsible for 
carrying out the will of the Congress and implementing its approved programs. It is the 
duty of the Standing Committee to provide UNITA with direction, and it “meets at least 
                                                        
9 Augusto Santana. 2006. Political Parties and Political Evolution in Angola. Johannesburg. EISA. P. 
16. 
10 Inge Amundsen and Markus Weimer. Opposition Parties and the Upcoming 2008 Parliamentary 
Elections in Angola. Chr. Michelsen Institute. Bergen, Norway. P. 29. 
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every three months, but more often if necessary.”11 Budget and finances are also under the 
purview of the Standing Committee. 
 The National Executive is composed of the president, the vice-president, the 
secretary general, and an executive committee of national secretaries for each province, 
chosen by the president. Besides the obvious importance of the presidency, the secretary 
general too assumes an essential role, since “this is where policies are developed, 
formulated, defined, and promulgated.”12 The National Advisory bodies (the Politburo, the 
National Assembly, and the Annual Conference), as the name implies, occupy an advisory 
role and provides a vital feedback mechanism. The levels of regional organization begin at 
the provincial branch, descending through the municipal, the communal, the zone, and the 
local branches.13  
 Given UNITA’s renowned history of being a disciplined liberation movement, it’s no 
surprise to find a party with moderately developed institutional structures. The lack of 
access to most of the country implies that the more localized levels of the party are left 
unattended, but there is little to no data to substantiate this. The constitution points to 
quite a bit of centralization in the party, with the executive seeming to represent the 
ultimate authority in decision-making. One should expect a high level of centrality 
considering Savimbi’s legacy in the party. Constitutionally, UNITA has made the transition 
                                                        
11 Ibid. The party president is also leader of this committee. 
12 Ibid. 
13 UNITA. Estatutos. Art. 19. 
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from guerrilla army to political party, but the path is uphill for them to further realize this 
metamorphosis. The hazardous state of Angolan politics make all questions open-ended.  
ANC 
 
The protracted conflict against Apartheid came to a symbolic end with the election of 
Nelson Mandela and the ascendency of the ANC to power in 1994. This historic watershed 
was accompanied by a new constitution in 1996 that deviated markedly from the one that 
guided the country for so long. This new constitution finally guaranteed “universal adult 
suffrage, regular elections and a multi-party system of democratic government.”14 The 
constitution makes room for party pluralism, but with the ANC averaging between 65-70% 
of the electorate’s vote over the last three national elections, South Africa exhibits the 
dominant-party variation of multiparty democracy.15 To elect their officials to the National 
Assembly, South Africa uses party-list PR, with the top spot becoming president of the 
republic.  
 South Africa has a well-developed legal framework concerning political parties. 
Citizens’ rights in forming political parties are found in the constitution’s Bill of Rights.16 
Electoral Commission Act 51 provides for the establishment and mandate of the 
Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), which maintains its independence despite ANC 
                                                        
14 Republic of South Africa. 1996, amended in 2009. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
Pretoria, South Africa. Ch. 1, Sec. 1. 
15 Independent Electoral Commission. South Africa. The ANC won 65.9% of the vote in the 1999 
elections, 69.7% in the 2004 elections, and 66.4% in 2009. 
16 Republic of South Africa. 1996, a. 2009. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. Ch. 2, Sec. 19. 
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dominance of the political arena. Within this law is a code of conduct which all political 
parties in South Africa must be signatory to. The code encourages parties to “facilitate 
equal participation of women, free electioneering, and to cooperate fully with the IEC,” 
while prohibiting them from “intimidating voters or their opponents, encouraging violence, 
offering inducements, or discriminating.”17 The Public Funding of Representative Political 
Parties Act 103 allocates funding to parties based on their representation in national and 
provincial governments. Electoral Act 73 gives further structure to elections, delineating 
requirements for voter registration and the voters’ roll.  
 The ANC has long operated under a democratic rubric that culminates in their 
current constitution. Rule 3 of the constitution describes the ANC’s character as: 
• Non-racial, non-sexist, and a democratic liberation movement; 
• Its policies are determined by the membership and its leadership is accountable to 
the membership; 
• Shall, in its composition and functioning, be non-racial, anti-racist and non-sexist 
and against any form of tribalistic exclusivism or ethnic chauvinism; 
• The principles of freedom of speech and free circulation of ideas and information 
shall operate within the ANC.18  
                                                        
17 Tom Lodge, and Ursula Scheidegger. 2006. Political Parties and Democratic Governance in South 
Africa. Johannesburg: EISA. P. 7. 
18 African National Congress (ANC). 2012. African National Congress Constitution. Mangaung, South 
Africa. Rule 3. 
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Any South African over the age of 18 can become a member of the ANC. The rights of an 
ANC member range from discussing and developing policy; being informed on policy; 
offering constructive criticism; and elect and be elected to party offices.19 An ANC 
member’s duties include taking part in party activities; know and execute party objectives; 
articulate those aims to the people; maintain discipline; and most importantly, combat 
racism, sexism, and all forms of political intolerance.20  
 ANC Policy positions are promulgated through routine conference resolutions, 
strategy and tactics papers, manifestos, and specific platforms. The newly adopted National 
Development Plan (NDP), which plots South African society’s trajectory through 2030, 
seeks to further transform it into one “that is non-racial, non-sexist, democratic, united, and 
prosperous.”21 The macroeconomic policy, like many aspects of ANC policy, echoes this 
egalitarian disposition by “confronting the triple challenge of unemployment, poverty, and 
inequality.”22 The ANC’s longevity means there is a temporal element to the policies of the 
party. Many ANC policies, including these, are highly reflective of the 1955 Freedom 
Charter, the party’s foundational document. The roots of current ANC policies can be seen 
in Charter passages like: “South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white; the 
                                                        
19 Ibid. Rule 5, Sec. 1. 
20 Ibid. Rule 5, Sec. 2. 
21 ANC. 2012. “53rd National Conference Resolutions.” Mangaung, South Africa. P. 11. 
22 Ibid. P. 25. 
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rights of the people shall be the same, regardless of race, color or sex; and the national 
wealth of the country, the heritage of South Africans, shall be restored to the people.”23  
 The bureaucratic organizational structure of the ANC is highly developed, and 
consists of the National Conference; the Provincial Conference; the Regional Conference; 
and the Branch Annual General Meeting.24 The National Conference is the supreme 
governing body of the ANC, meeting every five years. Rule 9, section 2 stipulates that 90% 
of the delegates attending the National Conference will be elected from the branches, with 
the other 10% chosen by leadership. Powers and duties of the National Conference include:  
• Decide and determine the policy, programme and Constitution of the ANC; 
• Receive and discuss the reports of the National Executive Committee (NEC); 
• Have the right and power to review, ratify, alter or rescind any decision taken by 
any of the constituent bodies, units or officials of the ANC; 
• Have the power to elect or appoint any commission or committee and assign 
specific tasks and duties to such commission or committee.25  
The most important duty of the National Conference besides policy formation is to elect the 
NEC. The NEC is responsible for directing the party between national conferences. The 
functions of the NEC consists of “oversight of the [Women and Youth] leagues’ activities, 
management of the ANC’s property, the issue of policy directives and the appointment 
                                                        
23 ANC. 1955. Freedom Charter. Johannesburg.  
24 ANC. ANC Constitution. Rule 7, Sec. 1. 
25 Ibid. Rule 11. 
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every year of a list committee to select (and ‘redeploy’) parliamentary candidates.”26 The 
National Conference will elect 60 members to the NEC, including the main executive 
positions, from a list compiled from branch nominations or nominated from the floor. The 
NEC will then elect the 30-member National Working Committee (NWC) from among its 
ranks. The NWC is responsible for enacting the will of the NEC, and reports back to it. At the 
53rd National Conference this past year, the minimum eligibility for the NEC was changed 
from five years paid membership to ten years. 
 The Provincial Conferences and the Regional Conferences both have executive 
committees, which are elected by the delegates at those conferences.27 There is a seven-
year membership minimum eligibility to be elected to the 20-member Provincial Executive 
Committee (PEC), and a five-year minimum for the Regional Executive Committee.28 This 
is up from the previous three and two-year minimum, respectively. The PEC also has an 
operating Provincial Working Committee, with functions much attuned to its national 
counterpart.29 The Provincial Conferences convene every three years, while the Regional 
meet every two. According to Rule 23.1, the branch “shall be the basic structure of the 
organisation.”30 The branch is conceptualized in the ANC constitution as the structure 
where the consensus-style democracy the party favors is employed in order for the 
                                                        
26 Lodge, and Scheidegger. Political Parties and Democratic Governance in South Africa. P. 7. 
27 ANC. ANC Constitution. Rule 19; 21, Sec. 10. 
28 Ibid. Rule 19, Sec. 3; 21, Sec. 5(3). 
29 Ibid. Rule 20. 
30 Ibid. Rule 23, Sec. 1. 
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community to debate and develop policy, and to “exercise their basic democratic rights.”31 
Whether or not this is the reality remains to be seen. A minimum of 100 members is 
necessary to establish a branch, implying robust gatherings at a basic level.32 The Electoral 
Commission, mandated with organizing party elections, and the Finance Committee, who 
handles the party accounts, augments these offices, offering more participation for 
decision-making bodies. 
 The ANC’s heritage as one of the oldest political parties has certainly had an effect 
on the sophisticated levels of bureaucratic development within the party structures and the 
organization. Steeping ANC policy and rhetoric in the foundational Freedom Charter has 
served the party thus well through tumultuous political transition. The high levels of 
bureaucracy allow for the possibility of quite a bit of participation. Again, closer 
observations may show other results. The eligibility requirements for many leadership 
positions, compared to other parties in the region, UNITA included, are fair and in a 
responsible timeframe to gain party experience. The ANC sees the local community, the 
branch, as its chief engine of policy development. While age does not always impart 
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Never a state to be considered politically idle, Zimbabwe’s strenuous development has seen 
it operate under multiple electoral systems, while the nature of the legal framework is 
constantly adapting to coalesce around new political realities. The precarious condition of 
Zimbabwe’s politics has certainly affected many parties, often to their detriment. This 
capricious nature makes it difficult for opposition parties, chief among them the MDC, to 
know what is expected of them, while attempting to conform to the current legalities. To 
accentuate this point, while this research was in progress Zimbabwe’s Parliament passed 
through a new constitution in March 2013; final product after years of deliberation by the 
GPA, formed from ZANU-PF, the two factions of the MDC, and civil society.33  
 The new Constitution of Zimbabwe reinstitutes the state as a sovereign, and 
democratic republic, and commits Zimbabwe to constitutional supremacy.34 Parliament is 
composed of the National Assembly and the Senate.35 Interestingly, the term multiparty 
democracy enters into the lexicon of the document only once, and that in reference to party 
funding.36 However, the spirit of multipartyism is still accounted for within, and 
guarantees Zimbabwean citizens over 18 the right “to form, to join and to participate in the 
                                                        
33 Elias Mambo. 2013. “Zimbabwe: New Constitution won’t Change Political Culture.” Zimbabwe 
Independent. 31 May. 
34 Republic of Zimbabwe. 2013. Constitution of Zimbabwe: Final Draft. Harare, Zimbabwe. Ch. 1, 
Sec. 12. Constitutional supremacy is the concept that all state laws and officials are subject to the 
constitution, which represents the supreme law of the land, and as such, cannot be contradicted. 
35 Ibid. Ch. 6, Part 2, Sec. 118. 
36 Ibid. Ch. 4, Part 2, Sec. 67(4). 
 62 
activities of a political party or organisation of their choice; to campaign freely and 
peacefully for a political party or cause; and to participate, individually or collectively, in 
gatherings or groups or any manner, in peaceful activities to influence, challenge or 
support the policies of the Government or any political or whatever cuase.”37 Nevertheless, 
these basic democratic ideals have been hard to achieve in the face of ZANU-PF’s 
intimidation and violence. While the constitution enables the possibility for multiparty 
democracy, like Angola, Zimbabwe has historically been a classic one-party state. The rise 
of the MDC though has caused a shift in the hegemony of ZANU-PF. The results of the last 
parliamentarian elections in 2008 show that the MDC achieved a majority in the National 
Assembly with 47.8% (99 seats) of the vote, compared to ZANU-PF’s 46.9% (97 seats).38 
The sizeable presence of the MDC has allowed it a limited capacity to influence the course 
of parliament, but the authority of the executive has undermined parliament, and 
encouraged the development of a dominant party system, with ZANU-PF setting the pace. 
Unlike South Africa’s dominant system, high levels of intolerance and brutality characterize 
Zimbabwe’s.  
 The character of the electoral systems reflects the complexities of Zimbabwean 
political life. Initially, Zimbabwe operated under the PR system according to the Lancaster 
House Constitution. This was later changed to the FPTP system. The shortcomings of this 
system were detailed earlier, and contributed to Zimbabwe’s turmoil noting, “nearly 40 
                                                        
37 Ibid. Ch. 4, Part 2, Sec. 67(2)(a-d). 
38 Zimbabwe Electoral Support Network. 2008. Parliamentary Election Results. Zimbabwe. 
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constituency results were challenged in courts following the 2000 parliamentary 
election.”39 The new constitution now calls for a mixed electoral system, with components 
of both FPTP and PR. The Senate is elected through party-list PR, composed of 60 members 
from Zimbabwe’s ten provinces, 16 chiefs elected by the provincial assembly of Chiefs, the 
President and Vice-President of the National Council of Chiefs, and two members elected to 
represent persons with disabilities.40 The National Assembly employs FPTP to elect its 210 
members, with an additional 60 women members elected through PR “based on the votes 
cast for candidates representing political parties in a general election.”41  
 Given the heightened state of politics in Zimbabwe, it comes as no surprise to find 
many laws regarding political parties besides the constitution. The Political Parties 
(Finance) Act enumerates how political parties can qualify and receive funding, but its true 
purpose is to cut off foreign funding to parties, which is seen by ZANU-PF as a tool for the 
MDC.42 The Electoral Act lays out the procedures for voter registration and qualifications, 
constituency delimitation, planning and commencing elections, and electoral disputes.43 
Section 238 of the constitution mandates the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) to 
execute these goals. The independence of this institution is highly questionable considering 
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that the president appoints the chairperson, as well as the eight other members from a list 
presented by the Committee of Standing Rules and Orders, and has the ability to reappoint 
members for one additional term.44 Consistent with other electoral commissions in the 
region, the ZEC upholds a code of conduct for political parties, committing them “to 
promote conditions that are conducive to free and fair elections and a climate of tolerance 
in which electioneering activity may take place without fear or coercion, intimidation or 
reprisals.”45 The Public Order & Security Bill 2001 (SOPA), a highly draconian law, seems 
to contradict this, enabling government forces to undermine the principles found in the 
code of conduct. This bill has been cited as the basis for constant interference in party 
functions, making it “difficult for civic organisations and parties to hold meetings and civic 
education classes.”46  
 The Constitution of the MDC illuminates how the party self-identifies. Article Four 
describes its character and culture: 
• A pro-poor, people-centered social democratic, non-racial and non-sexist 
movement; 
• In its composition and functioning shall be inclusive, tolerant and is against any 
forms of discrimination including racial, sexual and tribal discrimination; 
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• Considers democracy as a core value, to that extent, its policies are to be determined 
by its membership, and further, its leadership shall be accountable to the people; 
• Firmly believes in freedom of speech, freedom of expression and further, the free 
circulation of ideas and information within the movement; 
• Is against all forms of factionalism, fronticism, rumor-mongering, slander and 
character assassination.47  
It is worth noting that many of these articles were inserted into the constitution only two 
years ago at the Bulawayo Congress. The constitution does not make any provision for 
membership age, but given that the age of competency in Zimbabwe is 18, it stands to 
reason that the party conforms to this standard. Members are expected to “accept and 
conform to the constitution, pay regular subscriptions, promote and defend principles of 
the party, and take an active part in the life of his or her branch.”48 Members also retain the 
right to “vote in any party election, stand for and hold any office in the party, and to 
participate in all meetings and programmes of the party.”49  
 The MDC has managed to put forth distinctive policies from that of ZANU-PF, 
including its Conditions for a Sustainable Election in Zimbabwe (CoSEZ). This policy 
platform has been the backbone of the MDC since signing the Global Political Agreement 
(GPA) with the MDC-N (MDC-Ncube) and ZANU-PF. It details what reforms must be 
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implemented to achieve the goals of the GPA, including making Zimbabwe free and fair, and 
producing credible elections.50 The Jobs, Upliftment, Investment Capital & the 
Environment (JUICE) program is the party’s major economic manifesto. JUICE lays out the 
MDC’s economic development goals for Zimbabwe, which include “One million new jobs to 
be created between 2013-2018; projected average growth rate of 8% per annum between 
2013-2018; Macro economic stability anchored by single digit inflation; and running a 
green economy.”51 To further strengthen and articulate their position, the MDC presented 
in May 2013 its Agenda for Real Transformation (ART) platform. This platform includes 
multiple policies that intend to “transform the economy and the political culture through 
the application of the tenets of transformational leadership, in order to adequately respond 
to the people's basic needs.”52 These policies represent more than the basic call for change 
that MDC policies in the past have been criticized over. They signify a better political 
understanding of the situation, and perhaps a matured leadership.  
 The organizational structure of the MDC is almost Gordian in nature, with many 
overlapping offices. Adhering to the committee system, the main body of the party is the 
Congress, which convenes every five years, and whose functions are to: 
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• Formulate the policies and principles of the party; 
• Supervise the implementation of policies, principles and programmes of the party; 
• Elect members of the National Council; 
• Repeal or amend the Constitution; and 
• Review, ratify, modify, alter or rescind any decision taken by any organ or official of 
the party.53  
The Congress is composed primarily of the National Council, along with various other 
elements of the party. The National Council, though it is the “main policy implementing 
organ and shall have the authority to lead the organization,” is a composition of assorted 
committees, including the National Standing Committee (NSC) and the National Executive 
Committee (NEC).54 To be eligible for the National Council, and by extension its attendant 
committees, five years membership is required.55  
 The NSC is the main executive body housing the top executive positions, including 
the president, vice-president, and secretary general, whose members “shall be elected 
directly by Congress from nominations made by the Provinces.”56 Its task is the day-to-day 
administration of party affairs. The NSC, along with 12 provincial representatives, 12 
members directly elected by Congress, ten co-opted from the general membership, and the 
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respective secretaries of the women and youth assemblies, comprises the NEC.57 The 
NEC’s raison d’être is to “exercise all the functions of the National Council in between 
meetings.”58 Some of the powers of the NEC are to: 
• Implement the decisions and resolutions of the National Council; 
• Recommend party policies and programmes to the National Council; 
• Formulate and implement the current programs of the party; and  
• Ensure that the provincial, district, ward and branch structures of the party function 
democratically and effectively.59  
A National Conference is held annually to address issues concerning the party. Again, the 
National Council takes primary position. Also in attendance at these conferences are the 
members of the women and youth executives, provincial executive committee (PEC) 
members, and public officials of the party.60  
 The MDC divides the state into 12 provinces, and organizations the party 
hierarchically starting with the provincial level, down through the district, the ward, and 
lastly the branch. Each level is equipped with its own executive committee. The PEC’s core 
objective is to “build the Party in the province,” while also accountable for organizing 
district elections, and carrying out oversight functions related to the wards and 
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branches.61 As Sachikonye’s analysis points out, “the provincial, district, ward, and branch 
structures tend to replicate (at lower levels) the post and functions of the top 
structures.”62 Each level of the organization will hold its own assembly every five years, 
and it is there that the executive committees are elected. Like the National Council, a 
member must have five years party experience to hold office at a provincial level, and a 
two-year minimum to hold a position at the district level or be elected as a councilor.63 
Wards may not incorporate more than five branches without the approval of the NEC, and 
each branch must have at least 50 members to be established.64  
 After being in existence for only a little over 13 years, the MDC has progressed a 
long way from its initial labor roots. It has found a more distinct voice from that of ZANU-
PF, and can seem to offer more than just a change in government ministers. What it does 
have in common with ZANU-PF, however, is its highly centralized structure. Much of the 
power contained in the MDC Constitution is vested in the executive organs. This is 
consistent with the analysis of the previous two parties. The constitution appears to 
provide executives and provincial level members the best access to congresses and 
conferences. Unlike the ANC, these main deliberative bodies of the MDC seem to offer very 
little capacity for the lower level members to participate. Again, we will have to see if 
practice conforms to this interpretation of their constitution. 
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Now that there is an understanding of the political milieu the parties exist in, this thesis can 
address the most significant areas of intra-party democracy. This chapter will assess levels 
of intra-party democracy by analyzing a party’s inclusiveness over several determined 
factors. It will measure membership participation, including its composition, grassroots 
outreach, and its influence over policy. It will also review leadership elements, including 
measuring elections for leadership positions, oversight, tolerance, and levels of 
centralization. Other issues of leadership may arise that are idiosyncratic of a particular 
party, which will be duly addressed. These components, along with the following two, will 
be the main thrust of the argument.  
 The other important components of this chapter are women’s participation, and 
party economics. It’s important to conceptualize opposition parties as governments in 
waiting, and being so, they should take seriously those resolutions adopted by both 
national governments and regional bodies, like the SADC’s Protocol on Gender and 
Development. Article 12 of this document calls for all Southern African states to implement 
equality in representation at 50% for women in decision-making positions. All SADC states 
have signed this protocol, and it provides another factor to measure intra-party democracy. 
Party economics will also be evaluated in this chapter. While it is hard to make definitive 
statements on intra-party democracy looking at party finances, it does help illuminate a 
party’s character. By probing how parties approach their economic issues, centralization 
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UNITA claims its membership is estimated between 800,000 and one million, with UNITA 
President Isaias Samakuva asserting that UNITA represents 80% of the territory. UNITA’s 
history means it enjoys a good deal of support in the rural areas, which is extensive. This 
number, however, is about as realistic to verify as that of the population of Angola, which 
hasn’t conducted a census since 1970.1 While it’s informative to have an idea of 
membership size, the extent to which the party engages this membership, its grassroots 
outreach, is much more telling. UNITA, along with the MPLA, are the only parties with 
enough resources to conduct research to develop policy. UNITA conducts opinion polls in 
its constituencies, and employs the Institute for Democracy and Development to promote 
“the participation of citizens in public life and supports other democratic values.”2 
Organizationally the outreach mechanisms are there, yet there is little evidence of wide-
ranging party activities outside of the Congress and provincial conferences. The reason for 
this could be due to the fact that UNITA claims that there is not free access to many parts of 
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the country.3 UNITA, however, does have an extensive media department that is used to 
inform and educate its members on its ideals and policies.4 
 Another significant issue concerning membership and intra-party democracy is the 
administering of an oath of allegiance for new members.5 This oath calls on new members 
to be loyal to UNITA, and take up its causes and ideals. The language found here does not 
appear to be very accommodating of dissenting viewpoints. Abel Chivukuvuku, a former 
UNITA leader for 38 years and current president of the Broad Convergence of Salvation of 
Angola – Electoral Coalition (CASA-CE) party, points to this in an article, stating that people 
“live [in] anguish of having to submit to party loyalties, even when they do not agree.”6 
When party members do incur the wrath of leadership, discipline can be dictatorial and 
lacking in internal dialogue.7 This practice can severely hinder intra-party democracy 
when members are encouraged to abandon the party due to censure or not join it 
altogether, thus weakening it. Or, as is the case with Chivukuvuku, members start their own 
party, causing proliferation. Conversely though, opposition can fracture when members are 
punished, unfairly as they perceive it, for not respecting democratic decisions made by the 
party. 
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 Party leadership provides perhaps the best focal point for evaluating practices of 
intra-party democracy. Competition for leadership then becomes an important factor. 
Typical requirements for leadership positions one would expect to find include upholding 
party ideals, knowing the party line, be creative and inspirational, etc. While there does 
exist degrees of competition for less prestigious positions in the party, the position of party 
president is much less competitive. Santana notes that “although party statutes indicate 
that it is possible for various members to submit there candidature to the post of party 
leader, this is not yet practiced.”8 A common problem in African political parties is that 
leadership elections tend to be an assortment of the usual suspects of candidates. Since 
Jonas Savimbi’s death and UNITA’s consolidation into a political party in 2002 there have 
been three elections for party president, each with more than one candidate. Yet, these 
have all been party stalwarts, and UNITA’s Samakuva, going into his 13th year as president, 
has not faced a serious threat to the post.9 This could be due to the fact that one of the 
requirements a member has to meet to run for the top office is a minimum 15 year military 
record that can be verified by members in good standing. Currently, UNITA has no 
regulations concerning term limits for officials. 
 Initial observations could point to another commonality in African party politics, the 
dominant personality complex. This phenomenon is characterized as a “personality cult 
wherein a party was equated with the leader and the strong leader was perceived as the 
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embodiment of the party.”10 While one could argue that this was the case during Jonas 
Savimbi’s long tenure as UNITA leader, this tendency does not appear to be very prevalent 
today. It oversimplifies and marginalizes the role played by the other branches of the party. 
The death of Dr. Savimbi compelled UNITA to reassess and adapt the party, structure and 
identity. This is not to imply that the executive lacks power, quite the opposite. Oversight of 
party leadership is limited. Party elections are really the only time rank-and-file members 
can perform any oversight function over the leadership. Indeed, oversight is one of the 
main functions of the parliamentary caucus in the National Assembly, which is part of the 
National Advisory Body. In reality, the parliamentary caucus “must at all times and in all 
political questions follow the direction decided by the leadership organs of the party and 
the directives emanating from the Standing Committee.”11 The impression may be given of 
an authoritarian party, but leadership does not operate in a bubble, and a developed 
organizational structure helps buffer some of these authoritarian tendencies. Leadership 
appears to recognize this, noting that Samakuva earlier this year “swore in new officials 
appointed under the party’s ongoing reshuffle in order to boost the organization.”12  
 Another important litmus test, arguably as superlative in evaluating intra-party 
democracy as leadership, is the status of women in the organization. To be democratic, 
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there must be serious consultation with social groups, and with women comprising half the 
population it stands to reason that this presence should be reflected in truly representative 
parties. The SADC recognizes this with its 50% quota for political parties by 2015. UNITA 
somewhat conform to the SADC protocol by including a policy in which women should 
occupy 30% of all leadership positions.13 The party seems committed though, fielding 31% 
of its party-list with women candidates in the 2012 elections.14 That number is up 
significantly from an earlier study that puts UNITA’s female operational staff strength at a 
dismal 16%.15 UNITA also maintains a women’s organization, the Angolan Women’s 
League (LIMA).  
 While it’s not nearly as critical in gauging intra-party democracy as the two previous 
components, party economics does offer another dimension with which to perhaps gain a 
deeper understanding of internal functioning. According to UNITA officials, the party 
received about $700,000 in public funding from the state in 2012, with rates of funding tied 
to a party’s representation in parliament.16 UNITA supplements this with membership 
fees, of which leadership is responsible to pay additional dues at a rate commensurate with 
                                                        
13 Amundsen, and Weimer. Opposition Parties and the Upcoming 2008 Parliamentary Elections in 
Angola. P. 29. 
14 National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. 2012. Angola Elections Update. Luanda, 
Angola. 
15 Santana. Political Parties and Political Evolution in Angola. P. 45. 
16 Domingos Jardo Muekalia. Interview by Alex Vines. July 30th, 2012. Angola’s 2012 Elections: The 
View from the Opposition. Transcript. Chatham House. London. P.9. UNITA contends that this 
number is insufficient to effectively challenge the state, but given the MPLA’s disposition, that 
may be their strategy. 
 76 
their position. Unfortunately, it is impossible to gauge the extent of economic 
decentralization in UNITA with the present data, but a report confirms that provincial 
branches of the party do retain most of their membership fees.17 The lack of data also 
makes distribution of resources across ethnic lines indeterminable. It is quite possible that 
this distribution is equitable though, because unlike other African states, ethnicity is not a 
strong motivator in Angola.18 Therefore, ethnic tensions may be more muted, or 
nonexistent in some regions. 
ANC 
 
While enjoying the distinction of being the oldest party of this study, it is also the only party 
that is genuinely national in scope and influence, having a significant presence in all nine 
provinces of South Africa. Membership statistics tend to fluctuate between national 
conferences and elections, swelling during active periods. Between 2007 and the end of 
2012, ANC membership has oscillated between 600,000 and 1.2 million, the current 
number cited before the 53rd National Conference.19 These large numbers correspond to 
the notion that the ANC represents a wide swath of society including the poor, rural and 
urban, educated, minorities, unemployed, etc. The decidedly inclusive nature of the ANC 
“brings together histories and practices associated with exile, military organization, 
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domestic struggle, trade unionism, communism, and imprisonment, which together 
explains its complex nature.”20  
 Its history in the struggle against Apartheid helped the ANC develop into a truly 
mass-based organization, which regards and expects its members to be militant, tolerant, 
and politically conscious.21 In order to combat the ill pillars of Apartheid, the ANC could 
not afford to be exclusionary, and this has encouraged its democratic disposition. The MK 
Manifesto, issued in 1961, states that MK “includes in its ranks South African of all races.”22 
The MK Manifesto, like the Freedom Charter, illustrates the historical foundation for the 
mass-based, activist membership it has cultivated. Race is still a prevalent issue in South 
African politics, and ANC rhetoric addresses this. In practice, however, “the ANC, as a party, 
theoretically supports the ideal of non-racialism, [yet] it was clear, almost across the board 
that members feel there are significant problems with race relations within the ANC, at all 
levels.”23 Branch members also view party leadership as being restricted from non-African 
members, particularly at the national level.24  
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 It has been established though that grassroots outreach and rank-and-file 
participation is a better indicator of internal democracy. The data suggests that levels of 
grassroots outreach within the organization are high. Many programs have been instituted 
to encourage the participation of ordinary members, such as the Letsame (Working 
Together) campaign, initiated during the ‘Year of the Volunteer’, which had a different 
participatory theme each month.25 Besides conferences and meetings, policy positions, 
party developments, and other ongoing debates are communicated to the organization 
through a number of publications. These include ANC Today, the organizational newspaper, 
daily news briefings, NEC bulletins, and its academic journal, Umrabulo.  
 Membership participation in party policies can be qualified in a few ways, given the 
distinction between the origin of policies, and the development of them. Developing 
consensus within the community on issues is ultimately the flavor of democracy employed 
by the ANC, rather than a competition of policies. Party rhetoric and the ANC Constitution 
reflect this consensus-model with the orientation of the branch as the symbolic heart of the 
organization. Typically, branches hold monthly meetings that usually exceed 50 members, 
while having on average the required 100-250 paid members.26 It is these branch 
meetings that will also elect and send delegates to provincial and national conferences. 
Members too are responsible for generating a 200-member candidate list for the National 
                                                        
25 Tom Lodge. 2004. “The ANC and the Development of Party Politics in Modern South Africa.” 
Journal of Modern African Studies 42, no. 2: 189-219. P. 194. This program saw ANC members 
involved in activities like tree-planting, school cleanings, and the distribution of information 
about HIV/AIDS, according to Lodge. 
26 Lodge, and Ursula Scheidegger. 2006. Political Parties and Democratic Governance in South Africa. 
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Assembly, which “delegates [at provincial and national conferences] vote from nominations 
from nine provincial ‘list conferences’ and from branch submissions.”27  
 The party continually conducts research among the people to assess critical needs. 
Before the National Conference, a policy conference is held to debate and develop draft 
resolutions. According to the ANC, “the resolutions of the policy conference go back to the 
branches and to provincial congresses for further refining. The advantage of the system is 
that by the time we get to the national conference people will have discussed thoroughly 
and engaged with all the issues.”28 Despite the participatory atmosphere implied here, 
Malusi Gigaba, President of the ANC Youth League, argues that the conference resolutions 
“largely reflect the thinking of the national executive.”29 This is not to say that members do 
not participate, quite the opposite. Members’ main contribution to ANC policy is in its 
development through consensus. Development is where members exercise the most 
influence by adding their concerns and criticisms to the debate, thus potentially affecting 
policy by the time the conferences arrive. Yet, which issues take priority and are introduced 
for development is strictly the purview of the national executive. A study of the activity in 
wards, a community level body of the branch intended to offer “greater access to decision-
making,” seems to confirm the active role of rank-and-file members in policy development, 
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29 Malusi Gigaba. Interview with President of the ANC Youth League by Tom Lodge. July 2, 2003. 
Lutili House. Johannesburg 
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while highlighting their impotence in determining it.30 This marginalization of ordinary 
voices appears to have eroded the quality of the membership somewhat, leading to 
incidents of corruption. The ANC recognized this at the 53rd National Conference by 
declaring the next decade, ‘Decade of the Cadre’, which will “focus on the ideological, 
political, academic, and moral training of a critical mass of ANC members.”31 This stated 
commitment of the ANC to enhance its cadres, and thus its bodies, is evident in its raising of 
the minimum years of party membership needed to hold positions in executive committees 
throughout the structure. 
 Traditionally, party leadership at the national level has been fairly exclusive, with 
‘democratic centralism’ still imprinted in the party’s DNA from its days as a liberation 
movement.32 The broad, national character of the ANC structure offers many members the 
chance to participate in leadership positions at various levels of the organization. The NEC, 
however, has only recently begun to open its competitive base. In 2002, the top offices of 
the party received nominations from incumbents only, but this could be due to a focus on 
continuity rather than competition in early post-Apartheid South Africa.33 The centralized 
nature of the NEC has consistently found it trying to control the entire nomination process, 
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31 ANC. 2012. “53rd National Conference Resolutions.” Mangaung, South Africa. 
32 A term used by Anthony Butler, “democratic centralism” is part of the heritage of many liberation 
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while influencing who gets nominated for office. According to Lodge, “clearly the ANC 
leadership would prefer a process through which a chosen successor is appointed and 
groomed for office rather than an open contest,” and has used the NWC to discourage 
individual candidates from running for office.34 The promotion of an activist constituency 
has continually led to leadership being challenged on this front, with branches choosing the 
candidates they favor, signaling “the continuing political independence of branch 
delegations at provincial meetings.35  
 Throughout the research conducted, the most controversial aspect of leadership and 
member participation was the institution of deployment committees. Deployment 
committees are utilized as an extension of the NEC for the purpose of replacing 
incompetent cadres with effective ones, both in the party and in government.36 These 
committees are employed throughout the ANC structure, and are characterized by the 
sometime practice of placing party loyalists in leadership positions.37 Booysen argues that 
the “integrity of cadreship, and ANC appointments, had emerged as a major issue of 
concern” relating to deployment.38 In an article on ANC democracy, William Gumede went 
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37 Butler notes that provincial premiers and local mayors, among others, have been forced on 
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as far to accuse rank-and-file participation as a “charade”, and that their marginalization 
was so pronounced that it was causing serious fissures between a more insulated, and 
unresponsive leadership, and its members.39 Gumede indeed argues that the gap caused 
by deployment committees was the root of the Lonmin mine massacre in Marikana, South 
Africa in 2012.40 The ANC responded to this allegation in a letter by accusing Gumede of 
using anecdotal analysis to dismiss ANC processes.41  
 The data seems to support the ANC’s claim. It’s true that the nature of these 
committees makes them easily politicized; they too can be viewed as the gatekeeper to 
jobs. While the deployment committee structure definitely leaves itself open for “rampant 
self-interest, corruption and other anti-people activities to thrive,” it is not evidence for the 
systematic lack of intra-party democracy.42 While there does exist a gap, Gumede’s 
analysis perhaps too easily dismisses the role of an overtly militant membership base and 
its oversight functions. In fact, leadership has taken steps recently to increase participation, 
including a constitutional amendment instituting PR at the branch and provisional level, 
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and the abolishment of members being allowed to occupy a position in more than one 
constitutional structure.43 It is also worth mentioning that 39 of the 86 directly elected 
members of the NEC at the Polokwane Conference had been first-timers.44 Because 
deployment committees fill positions for party and state concurrently, however, it will 
become important for these committees to become independent of leadership, or even be 
subsumed as an organ of the state altogether to insure its effectiveness in its duties.  
 The high level of ‘democratic centralism’ within the ANC therefore makes oversight 
of the party leadership critical in maintaining a healthy organization. The National 
Conference is regarded in the constitution as the most authoritative body in the party, but 
in their own capacity they exercise very little oversight of leaders’ decisions other than 
elections and voting on resolutions. It was established earlier in this chapter that 
resolutions are generally reflective of leadership positions, so how do members exercise 
oversight in the ANC? The data will show that the type of oversight that has developed 
largely conforms to the consensus-activist model for membership illustrated earlier. The 
radical nature of the ANC itself provides the mechanism needed for oversight. There are a 
few examples that underscore this practice. 
 The 1996 ‘Growth, Employment, and Redistribution’ (GEAR) government policy, 
adopted by the NEC, had until recently been “the most authoritative statement on the 
official approach to macro-economic issues, committing the state to restraint in public 
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expenditure, speedy deficit reduction, further liberalization of trade, and privitisation of 
parastatal corporations.”45 Given the ANC’s historically extensive leftist credentials, this 
policy caused a great deal of discord, especially among its allies, the SACP and COSATU. The 
leftist members of the ANC felt that leadership was abandoning, or at the very least 
circumscribing, their commitment to the social revolution. Leadership responded with a 
characteristically punitive stance, earning it a reputation for intolerance, which will be 
discussed subsequently. It even went as far to question the relevance of the alliance with its 
liberation compatriots.46 The SACP and COSATU mobilized a critical amount of members 
against the leadership’s position, using mass strikes and protests to communicate their 
dissatisfaction. In the end, many members blamed party leaders for the divisions that had 
arisen, and some leaders lost their positions over supporting GEAR.47  
 The current macroeconomic program, the NDP, has engendered much the same 
debate. The National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA), part of COSATU, has 
argued that the plan “does not alter the colonial character of the South African economy 
and the dominance and control of White Monopoly Capital and Trans National 
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Corporations.”48 Aubrey Matshiqi, a South African political analyst, points to this as “a 
resuscitation of the unhappiness with the leadership and policies which emerged even 
before Mangaung [Conference].”49 Coupled with COSATU’s reservations over the ANC 
leadership’s policy direction, NUMSA is prepared to take its protest to the streets, “and 
push for policies contained in the Freedom Charter, such as nationalisation of mines and 
banks.”50 The right-wing shift in the ANC’s economic policy seemed less about abandoning 
socialism though, but instead conforming and integrating the South African economy into 
the developing globalized economy. Either way, mobilization of the rank-and-file has a 
profound effect on the behavior of the leadership. 
 Another instance in which mass mobilization has impacted leadership was the 
highly public dispute over leadership’s attitude towards HIV/AIDS treatment. The 
controversy arose after the government decided to cancel prescriptions for AZT, an anti-
retroviral drug, to “HIV/AIDS patients on grounds of both its expense and supposed 
‘toxicity’.”51 In fact, government and ANC President Thabo Mbeki supported radical 
medical views that asserted poverty caused HIV/AIDS, “and was simply accentuated by the 
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prescription of anti-retroviral medication.”52 While Mbeki was supported by many health 
ministers, he found robust opposition from ordinary members, many dependent on anti-
retroviral medication, and also from within the ranks of the ANC leadership. ANC members 
formed a lobby, the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), to pressure Mbeki to reverse his 
position, challenging the drug ban in court through a series of suits. Mbeki and other ANC 
leaders would rely on the customary tactics of attempting to discredit their opponents.53 
The opposition though was generated from many disparate elements of the ANC and 
society, with Mandela even publically backing the TAC. These convergent forces, among 
them “resignation threats by the director general of the Department of Health, the 
Constitutional Court’s finding in favour of the TAC, and lobbying by two key figures in 
Mbeki’s entourage,” had succeeded in reversing the president’s stance, finally acceding to 
the distribution of the medications.54  
 These examples show the ANC membership’s amazing ability to form internal 
lobbying mechanisms to debate with and influence leadership. Unlike developed states, 
South Africa’s political lobbying community is relatively embryonic, thus leaving this role 
to activists of both party and state. While leadership may opine the need to keep criticism 
within party structures, the internalizing of lobbies by rank-and-file members provides an 
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effective mechanism for ensuring the vitality of democratic institutions. Because National 
Conferences have limited oversight, the militant nature of the membership that ANC 
history and rhetoric reinforces, and its ability to mobilize, becomes the dominant force in 
oversight procedures. The same cannot be said of the oversight responsibilities of the 
parliamentary caucus, however. 
 The ANC Code of Conduct stresses the need for MPs to remain accountable to the 
party, even before the state. Much like UNITA’s structure, MPs are effectively subject to the 
authority of the NEC. According to MPs, “caucus meetings feature plenty of debate and 
represent the key sites of backbencher oversight of the executive,” admittedly in a less free 
environment, while parliamentary challenges to government ministers “tend to arise from 
‘safe’ issues that do not raise important questions of principle.”55 MPs have tried to secure 
special constitutional status for themselves, only to be voted down by the Mafikeng 
National Conference in 1997.56 As of yet, no special status is garnered on MPs. The 
reluctance on behalf of MPs to challenge leadership’s positions can be mostly explained by 
the previously mentioned intolerance of the leadership. 
 Tolerance of divergent views is an indispensible pillar of democracy, making it a 
necessary component for democratic organizations. The examples of leadership’s tolerance 
that have emerged from the analysis thus far do not portray it in the best light. ANC 
leadership appears to be highly reactionary to criticism, and has developed a habit out of 
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attempting to discredit and silence opponents. When Jeremy Cronin, SACP leader and ANC 
Cabinet Minister, criticized leadership over the GEAR program he was labeled by the ANC 
presidential spokesman as a “frustrated individual, unfaithful and guilty of spreading 
deliberate lies.”57 When Julius Malema, former President of the ANC Youth League, in 2012 
criticized President Jacob Zuma for running the party in a dictatorial manner and not 
delivering on political promises, he was suspended for five years, pending appeal.58 
Membership’s fear of retaliation and rebuke by leadership can have the effect of severely 
stifling debate within the party.  
 Where the ANC excels in intra-party democracy is in its representation of women in 
leadership structures and in government ministries. It is the only party in this study to 
actually realize the SADC’s Protocol on Gender and Development. Indeed, South Africa has 
one of the highest averages of women in parliament at 42.3%.59 The ANC Constitution was 
amended in 2007 to ensure 50-50 parity “in all elected structures of the ANC to enable such 
effective participation.”60 This includes the executive, parliament, and local government; 
all levels of the organization. It also claims the ANC Women’s League. The use of PR 
throughout the state and party apparatus has certainly contributed to this development. As 
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time goes on, it appears this practice is becoming significantly entrenched.61 This makes 
sense given the role of women in the liberation struggle. The ANC’s well-chronicled 
position of a completely democratic society regardless of sex has been a central policy of 
the organization, helping inform the party consciousness since the 1955 Freedom Charter.  
 Lastly, there is evidence that the party purse strings are becoming slightly more 
relaxed. Like many African states, public funding in South Africa is based on a party’s 
representation in the legislature, with the ANC spending over half of this on allowances for 
constituency offices.62 At the 52nd National Conference in Polokwane, it was voted that all 
membership fees should be allocated to the branches, but the 53rd National Conference 
recognized that this had yet to be instituted and called for its immediate implementation.63 
The ANC notably receives the majority of corporate funding in South Africa.64 It is difficult 
to get exact numbers pertaining to party economics, however, due to economic disclosure 
being voluntary, and the lack of any funding limit in South Africa. The ANC leadership has 
been accused on multiple occasions of misappropriating these funds, most recently stirring 
up controversy over funds being used for an ANC councilor meeting in the Eastern Cape.65 
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The picture that emerges is that of a leadership with a tight grasp on party finances, but not 
one that is overtly corrupt, with the exception of a few bad apples. The lack of transparency 
leaves party finances open to abuses though. This absence of pellucidity may prove too 
tempting for weaker willed members to ignore as democratic practices become more 
normalized, and members’ revolutionary passions cool. 
MDC 
 
Following the consolidation of ZAPU into ZANU-PF, opposition parties in Zimbabwe had 
many false starts during the 1990s, none of which came close to challenging Mugabe. The 
MDC has changed that over the last decade. They have become the first opposition party in 
Zimbabwe to ascertain a genuine presence throughout the country. Their strongest support 
comes from mainly the urban centers of Harare and Bulawayo, as well as the Ndebele-
populated southern region.66 They have even established a footing, although diminutively, 
in traditional ZANU-PF provincial strongholds like Mashonaland Central and East.67 They 
tend be weakest in rural areas, with ZANU-PF’s violence driving many “party activists into 
the cities.”68 The autocratic rule of Mugabe stimulated the convergent forces that now 
make up the MDC, which include “trade unions, disgruntled intelligentsia, students, and the 
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civil society movement.”69 The membership numbers of the MDC, like many African 
political parties, are virtually impossible to know. Particularly because of the land 
invasions, the MDC composition also includes white commercial farmers. ZANU-PF has 
used this association to attack the MDC as front for white interest, invoking the still-
resonant liberation “ethos”, the “view that only liberation parties could represent the ‘will 
of the people’,” to paint the MDC as “collaborators.”70 The data does not support Mugabe’s 
claim, but it does show a willingness on the part of the MDC to abide by the non-racial 
character of the constitution, even if some within the party seem reluctant to admit white 
farmers. 
 The grassroots outreach corresponds to that of other African opposition parties 
facing state repression. Based on the previous statements, outreach for rank-and-file MDC 
members is most efficient in their urban redoubts. The lack of access to rural areas has 
naturally curtailed much of the outreach efforts there. To enhance its cadres, the party uses 
education programs, orientations, and workshops, like the one held by the party’s Elections 
Directorate in Harare on May 2013 that addressed over 900 hopeful parliamentary 
candidates on the “MDC’s values and principles, [and to] shun from any form of violence, 
corruption and other vices.”71 Sachikonye notes, however, there does not exist an 
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entrenched practice of public opinion polling, and that NGOs have historically filled this 
need.72 Policy is communicated to the electorate through the MDC’s publication The Real 
Change Times, compounded by statements, press releases and other communiqués. It is 
during campaign phases though when the MDC articulates its “policy positions in the form 
of manifestos.”73 This is evident in their timing of the release of the ART manifesto, coming 
just before elections due to be held in July or August 2013.74  
 The participation of rank-and-file members in developing these policies appears 
limited. While the data tends to agree there is a certain level of discussion on policy in the 
MDC, it is nowhere near the institutionalized levels reached by the ANC to influence the 
direction of policy. The Policy Council is ultimately responsible for research, determining 
policy direction, and developing those positions into distinct manifestos.75 Also in contrast 
to the ANC is the lack of branch-level members at National Congresses and conferences. In 
fact, the only representatives branch members have at these events appear to be elected 
MPs, mayors, and chairpersons.76 Most representation comes from the provincial level, as 
branches tend to be weak. LeBas’s analysis describes the establishment of a branch as 
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follows: “[An] individual would be provided with party flyers, instructed in how to organize 
a branch structure, and sent off to the constituency.”77 When in 2002 a mass protest was 
scheduled by leadership, rank-and-file members “expressed some degree of anger that the 
grass-roots structures had not been previously consulted.”78 Add to this the fact that the 
very structure of the MDC constitution allows for little-to-any participation of basic 
members, and it becomes evident that rank-and-file voices can be lost. 
 The competition for leadership, elections for both the internal party leadership and 
those running for state office, is where the rank-and-file can have the most impact. The 
MDC’s multiplicative hierarchical structure offers the chance of leadership participation at 
various levels, consistent with the other parties of this study. Yet, it is the nature of MDC 
elections themselves that opens it up to more competitive contests for leadership, and 
provides ordinary members with virtually the only way in which to exercise oversight of 
party leaders. The MDC is the only party of this study to use a primary system, which is a 
system of internal elections to narrow the party’s candidate list down to those who will 
challenge for office. This system tends to ensure the most accountability “because it 
removes power from political leaders and transfers it to the people.”79 It offers many 
candidates for the membership to select from, noting that many staunch party leaders have 
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been overturned in the current primaries, which began in May 2013.80 There are inherent 
flaws though, which will be discussed shortly. 
 MDC primaries happen in two phases: confirmation, and elections. Sachikonye 
describes this complex process as: 
 A procedure whereby candidates get nominated to contest in national and local 
elections. Aspiring candidates submit their résumés to a provincial committee, 
which puts their names on a panel list. The panel list of each constituency is then 
forwarded to the national council through the secretary general. The panel list of 
parliamentary candidates seeking nomination in each province is sent to district 
and ward committees that then choose nominees. For nomination, a candidate 
requires a simple majority. For re-nomination to a parliamentary seat, a candidate 
needs at least a two-thirds majority.81  
 
Essentially, district and ward lists are whittled down to 2/3 of eligible candidates in a 
preliminary election (confirmation), who will then go on to contest the position for which 
they applied. The problem with this process in terms of intra-party democracy is that the 
National Council ultimately approves all lists, making them the gatekeepers, while also 
confining selection to leadership’s predetermined preferences. The constitution grants the 
National Council the power to “disqualify or reject any selected candidate where it is 
satisfied that it is not in the interest of the party,” and further allows it to choose its own 
candidate in the event of such a disqualification.82 The imposition of candidates has 
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contributed to the “culture of clientelism that has perverted internal party politics,” and 
further alienates rank-and-file members.83  
 There is evidence of the National Council’s manipulation in the current primaries. 
Many members complain of being “subtly blocked from contesting against party 
heavyweights through the controversial confirmation process.”84 This is exemplified in the 
capital Harare, “where most of the standing committee members are unopposed after 
aspiring candidates were disqualified.”85 The provinces have also pointed to a lack of 
transparency and definitive criteria regarding elections.86 The Elections Directorate cooks-
up the procedures for each recurring election, rather than having a definitive legal 
framework to inform each election objectively. This does nothing to ensure “the selection 
of competent candidates who would have been endorsed by their constituencies.”87 
Exacerbating this is the fact that the Elections Directorate is answerable to the National 
Council.  
 Obviously, the portrait of a highly centralized party begins to emerge. The degree to 
which leadership is centralized is illustrated in the party’s fierce debate of whether or not 
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to contest the 2005 senatorial elections. The National Council was split on the issue, with 
President Tsvangirai and his supporters opposed to standing in the elections, while 
secretary-general Ncube and his faction held that the party should contest them.88 The 
National Council voted 33-31 to contest the elections, yet President Tsvangirai unilaterally 
declared that the MDC would not take part, stating, “I am President of this party. I am 
therefore going out of this and [will] announce to the world that the MDC will not 
participate in this election.”89 Tsvangirai believed he was following through with what the 
people wanted, and felt there was a disconnect between a “pro-senate” faction concerned 
with lofty intellectual ideals and that of the people’s basic needs. Even though Tsvangirai’s 
“views [resonated] with those of many Zimbabweans who feel the Senate [was] a waste of 
money,” it does not dispel the fact that Tsvangirai overrode a democratic decision made by 
the party.90 Other evidence for centralized decision–making is found in Tsvangarai’s 
sometime use of unofficial “kitchen” cabinets, which “undermined the decisions of the 
elected leadership.”91  
 The senatorial debate highlights another critical area concerning the MDC’s internal 
democracy: factionalism, which is seen as the outcome of a lack of tolerance. The language 
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of the MDC constitution is very inclusive, but the actions of leadership can contradict this. 
The fault lines over the Senate issue were initially seen to be along ethnicity, with 
Tsvangirai belonging to the Shona ethnic group, and his critics comprised of mainly 
Ndebele.92 The MDC, however, “largely transcended the regional and ethnic identities that 
had previously structured party politics in Zimbabwe,” and it soon became clear these 
tensions were between the intellectual/labor roots of the MDC.93 Through mutual 
mistrust, the divide grew to the breaking point, and along with reasons that will be 
explained momentarily, the MDC fractured.94 This division seems less pronounced 
following the formal split, but much of the data suggests that the presence of factionalism is 
manifest in the current primary elections.95  
 The MDC has weak oversight mechanisms and lacks organizational checks and 
balances, which is apparent in the previous examples. The most glaring case of the MDC’s 
lack of oversight on leadership is in its exploiting of parallel power structures, known as 
action committees, which most scholars and analyst on Zimbabwean politics agree was 
actually at the heart of the MDC split after the Senate election. The failure of the mass 
protest in 2002 led to the formation of these parallel structures, created “to facilitate top-
down organizing and speedy response to orders from the national leadership, [and] were 
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seen to be superior to official party structures precisely because they were less democratic, 
required less explanation of party motivations or strategy, and were composed of more 
militant party followers.”96 While they were intended to act as a stabilizing mechanism in 
the face of ZANU-PF’s political assaults, the action committees are prone to violence, and 
have been known to “coerce popular participation in mass actions or use other tactics that 
run counter to the MDC’s liberal democratic principles.”97 This was the case leading up to 
the Senate elections.  
 When the Management Committee was tasked with finding out who was responsible 
for the violence, it was instantly in a precarious position since there were some members of 
this committee who were making use of the parallel structures, and as Brian Raftopoulos 
points out, “they were in fact judges in their own case.”98 Ultimately, no consequences 
were brought to bear on party leaders, only that of a few party youths were expelled.99 The 
use of these parallel structures has opened the MDC to criticisms of violence being endemic 
within the party. Alleged members of a rival faction attacked Trudy Stevenson, an MDC-N 
MP, in 2006, some of whom she identified as members of the MDC-T’s parallel 
structures.100 In the run-up to the 2011 National Congress, the Zimbabwe Election Support 
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Network (ZESN) reported the use of violence by party candidates in the proceeding 
campaigning phase.101 Since the highly public break of the MDC and the signing of the GPA, 
the national leadership has relied less on this dubious institution, but an MDC commission 
established in 2012 to investigate violence found evidence of certain executives and 
candidates employing parallel structures at a provincial level.102  
 So far, the MDC’s commitment to intra-party democracy seems tepid. The party’s 
figures in relation to gender equality helps bolster this antithetical view. Zimbabwe too is 
signatory to the SADC Protocol on Gender and Development, making the MDC’s compliance 
obligatory. The constitution has no definitive language declaring 50-50 parity within the 
party. The closest it comes to enshrining it in the foundational document is by stating that 
the party will strive for gender parity “as much as possible.”103 It neither guarantees 
parity, nor provides any mechanism to enforce this measure other than the will of the 
National Council. In the 2008 harmonized elections, only 11.96% of the MDC candidates for 
the House of Assembly were women, while it managed 30% for the Senate.104 Currently, 
the NSC is about 15% women, while the larger NEC has an estimated 36%.105 It will be 
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interesting to see how these percentages may change in the next national elections, due 
sometime at the end of summer 2013. 
 Lastly, party economics of the MDC remains surreptitious. The Political Parties 
(Finance) Act states that any party that receives more than 5% of the vote is entitled to 
state funding based on their representation. Party accounting is done internally, and “is not 
meant for public consumption.”106 This makes the MDC’s finances, and its distribution, 
impossible to deduce. What is known is that the MDC “relies on business donors, 
membership dues as well as rental revenue from leasing properties in Harare” to furnish 
the party’s coffers.107 The National Council retains firm control over party funds, deciding 
the “manner in which money may be withdrawn for Party use, including a prescription of 
which officers shall be signatories to Party accounts.108 Given the degree of centralization 
that has been alluded to throughout this section, one could reasonably draw the conclusion 
that national leaders tightly guard their control over party finances.  
Final Observations 
 
Party inclusiveness, and its integrants, has certainly shown to be the most critical aspect of 
the framework constructed throughout this thesis. Any research on intra-party democracy 
going forward would benefit from expanding this component. The Angolan opposition 
party UNITA appears to have above-average levels of intra-party democracy. UNITA has 
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made significant strides in its development as a democratic political party. Its high levels of 
organization during its years as a liberation guerrilla army have certainly contributed to 
UNITA’s well-maintained apparatus today. It has successfully managed to transcribe its 
ideals constitutionally, and develop new, concise, and democratic policies; anathema to 
many post-liberation political parties. Having said this, UNITA still faces substantial 
challenges to consolidating democratic values in the party. The structure of the party is 
highly centralized, with authority oriented hierarchically. Much of the constitutional power 
is vested in the executive branch, with policy priorities and development determined there. 
UNITA will need to disseminate some of this authority to other organs, as well as relax 
some presidential qualifications if it wants to make way for legitimate competition. 
Stability rather than competition in the presidency may be the desired effect however, 
given the MPLA’s hostility towards opposition parties, UNITA in particular. Participation 
for other leadership positions has certainly increased, especially among women, who now 
constitute a little over 30% of the leadership. The use of PR in elections encourages this 
positive trend. Rank-and-file participation is limited, but growing as more access is 
achieved throughout the country. All evidence points to a political party that is growing 
more accustomed to democratic procedures, and aware of their own vital role in continuing 
consolidation efforts. 
 The ANC displays high levels intra-party democracy, with a few caveats. It is easily 
the highest scoring party in this study. The long held beliefs of the ANC have helped it 
achieve a prestigious place within South African politics. For over a century it has led the 
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struggle from opposition party to dominant party. Overall, the elements of intra-party 
democracy seem to have established firm roots in the organization. The percentage of 
women represented in the party structures and in government is one of the highest in the 
world, and grassroots outreach is extensive and genuine. Though intra-party democracy 
levels are high in the ANC, there remains room for considerable improvement. The data 
shows white members have a difficult time achieving positions of importance within the 
party, while basic-level branch members believe there does exist barriers to non-Africans’ 
advancement. While leaders tend to set the agenda for policy, members have a role in its 
advancement. The lack of input in crafting resolutions has tended to erode cadre quality. 
Another potential explanation for this could be that after almost 20 years, the normalizing 
of democratic values, with its associated devolution of quality, may have set in. 
 It is no surprise the ANC has embraced ‘democratic centralism’ when one takes into 
account its origin as a liberation movement. The organization allows for active 
participation, but only recently has the upper echelons of the party been opened. This has 
led to leadership becoming insulated and unresponsive at times. The isolation has caused 
conflict, even violent outbursts. There is a need for leadership to actively engage members, 
but this gap can also be seen “as the inevitable outcome of the tensions between the 
militant activism that that was so indispensible in mobilising the ANC’s ‘struggle’ 
constituency, and a leadership increasingly attuned to the compromises of parliamentary 
politics.”109 Deployment committees, on the other hand, occupy a dubious place in the ANC 
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hierarchy. Its unelected nature and open structure makes it vulnerable to politicizing, and 
Booysen notes that “questions were raised by NEC members about the integrity of the 
national deployment committee,” and “after its brief and controversial formal existence, the 
deployment committee was suspended in 2001.”110 The national deployment committee 
received a renewed mandate in 2007.111 These need desperate restructuring and more 
independence. It may perhaps be better to be a function of the state altogether. Either way, 
further analysis of deployment committees will show a need to reorganize local elections.  
 Member oversight of leadership relies on protest, and the creation of lobbies within 
the party. The party exhibits a centralized leadership, highly buffeted by a fundamental 
membership, imbued with “the spirit and culture of activism.”112 Where leadership lacks 
intra-party democracy is in its fostering of conflict through its intolerance. The reactionary 
nature of leadership has kept some members from challenging the structures of power. In 
spite of all this, the ANC has continually committed itself to leading the cause of 
democratization in South Africa. Whether or not it will continue to occupy that role will 
remain to be seen. One could argue that these deficiencies in internal democracy led to the 
creation of the ANC-offshoot opposition party the Congress of the People (COPE) that 
occurred “in the heat of Mbeki’s Polokwane [Conference] defeat and a period of 
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antagonistic populist mobilisation.”113 One could also point out that the broad nature of 
the ANC would potentially produce a viable opposition, especially given the intensely 
debated ‘crisis’ leadership is going through.114  
 Democratic foundations and an active membership have curtailed potentially 
undemocratic behavior. The party strides the line between stability and freedom that can 
be so elusive in African politics, and has managed to keep itself relevant in a consistently 
changing society. The ANC should not take its challenges to intra-party democracy lightly, 
as this can have dire long-term effects. Their vow of carrying out their ideals of non-
racialism appears languid in practice. Yet, the ANC’s commitment to democratic ideals over 
such a long period, and its seeming ability to rejuvenate itself, encourages the hope of the 
ANC’s positive role in South Africa’s continued democratic consolidation.  
 Unlike the other parties of this study, the MDC displays low levels of intra-party 
democracy. Yet, the MDC strives to meet democratic ideals. There are elements within the 
party structure that can enhance intra-party democracy, but also many that hinder it. 
Complex is only the beginning when attempting to articulate Zimbabwean politics. The 
MDC is a natural product of this convolution, with its own corresponding inherent 
intrepidness and imbroglios. While the MDC possesses serious shortcomings, many ardent 
Zimbabweans dedicated to the peaceful, democratic transformation of the state make up its 
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composition. Much of the this support is drawn from the urban centers of Zimbabwe, but as 
violence decreases, the party is developing more and more links with the countryside, 
having long been the domain of ZANU-PF. The language of the MDC constitution is rooted in 
non-racial, non-sexist liberal democracy, and opens its structures to all. In practice, the 
MDC has been mostly successful in achieving this. Perhaps even more acutely than South 
Africa, race plays a pivotal role in the discourse of Zimbabwean politics, and at times some 
MDC members have expressed displeasure with the admittance of whites, specifically 
white farmers. Not bowing to this pressure has illustrated the MDC’s commitment to non-
racial democracy, though it has been known to curtail white involvement in “an attempt to 
deal with the labeling of the MDC as a ‘white controlled’ party.115  
 Because of the robust presence of the MDC in cities and communal areas, outreach 
has historically been more active there. The political space created by the SADC-facilitated 
GPA has allowed for increased conducting of political education drives, policy workshops, 
and other party activities. There is a critical need, however, to engage the membership 
more sincerely and more routinely over the development and adoption of party policies. An 
analysis of the MDC shows that rank-and-file participation is insufficient, both at national 
gatherings and in determining policy. The problem stems directly from the composition of 
the MDC constitution, which has little-to-no institutional constructs to ensure adequate 
participation of grassroots members.  
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 The primary system used in MDC elections offers its members greater opportunity 
of choice in selecting its representatives, and encourages more accountability of solicitors 
to their constituencies. Primary elections are a good start to ensuring intra-party 
democracy, but a report by the Elections Resource Centre found that “internal party 
systems and regulations for candidate selection are not precise enough to allow the 
democratic selection of candidates.”116 There are two caveats to the MDC’s practice. First, 
the National Council must initially approve the lists of candidates to be provided to 
members, thus subjecting members’ preferences to the governing body’s proclivities. 
Second, primaries create competition over scarce positions within the party, which has 
shown to lead to factionalism, and episodes of violence. The National Council has played 
arbiter in candidate selection, most recently resulting in some party heavyweights going 
unchallenged in elections. While this may be to protect senior members, it could also be 
viewed as a move by the MDC to maintain continuity and stability heading into what will be 
historic national elections. The logical need for this confirmation process is apparent when 
considering the specters of corruption and violence that party leaders must always be 
vigilant for. 
 Much of the power is vested in the national executive. The MDC shares the highly 
centralized nature that characterizes the structures of parties like ZANU-PF and the ANC. 
Yet, both of them evolved out of Marxist-inspired national liberation movements, while the 
MDC coalesced from the NCA/labor interactions of the late 1990s. Whether or not the 
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committee system has served the MDC well remains for further debate. Tolerance has been 
an issue for the MDC, but appears to be along more nascent social lines (intellectual/labor), 
rather than ethnicity. Intolerance seems to manifest itself more in squabbles between the 
two MDC parties. 
 There exists almost no systematic oversight of party leadership. The reliance on 
parallel power structures, or action committees, has become a challenge to intra-party 
democracy. For a party that has had to shift into survival mode, which was the case 
between 2005-2008, it is understandable to rely on these structures in order to endure, 
and provide much needed stability. But the overreliance on them can have the effect of 
eroding and undermining democratic principles. Chan notes that Tsvangirai would use “the 
parallel structure even when there was no immediate emergency.”117 The tendency to 
employ parallel structures, however, has declined after the formation of the GNU in 2009. 
 There is engagement with women, but there is a lack of genuine consultation that 
seems to be a reflection of patriarchy in Zimbabwean society. In an article by Grace 
Kwinjeh, she writes, “that unless the MDC is prepared to ‘dismantle the exhausted 
patriarchal model of liberation’ the new Zimbabwe will simply be a continuation of the old 
albeit with different faces.”118 Only the NEC manages to obtain over 30% female 
representation. A reanalysis will have to be conducted after the next elections to determine 
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if the MDC makes any improvements in realizing the SADC gender protocol. Finally, the 
only knowledge MDC economics imparts in regards to intra-party democracy is a 
confirmation of the centralization of leadership, and a need to develop more transparent 
standards for party finances.  
 It is easy to forget in the maelstrom of Zimbabwean politics that the MDC is still 
young, and has catapulted to national prominence very quickly. They have a majority in 
parliament, and seem posed to capture the presidency in the upcoming elections. They 
have the principles sufficient for a democratic party, but reforms will be needed, and 
clearly a democratic culture is still being conditioned.  
 The evidence from the research confirms that political parties are fundamental 
constituents of a democracy. Further, the data suggests that efficient, democratic parties 
are essential for the continued consolidation of democratic values and practices within a 
society. Conversely, parties that only speak to democratic values but lack the practices can 
decidedly hinder consolidation efforts. The hypothesis of this study, that decreasing 
adherence to internal democratic procedures within a party leads to party fracturing, 
seems to be confirmed in the analysis. The MDC, which exhibits the lowest levels of intra-
party democracy in this study, has split into four separate parties since 2005, making it 
difficult to challenge ZANU-PF’s dominance.119 The ANC, on the other hand, was shown to 
have the highest levels of intra-party democracy. As a result, the ANC has managed to 
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maintain a solid membership-base. The only exception to this was the spawning of COPE, 
but for a party as old as the ANC, its not uncommon to have a splinter group. UNITA has 
also fairly maintained stability within the party. 
 The beginning of this thesis addressed the possible affect of authoritarian culture on 
these parties. Ali Mazrui, a renowned Kenyan scholar, argues that culture has a profound 
impact on politics today that cannot be disregarded.120 The Election Resource Centre in 
Zimbabwe feels “internal party democracy has a wider impact on national governance, [as] 
it enhances a necessary democracy culture within political parties that will naturally 
transcend to the society at large.”121 The culture correlation is evident in the findings of 
this study. Centralization of power is the hallmark of an authoritarian regime, and can, at 
various times, be applied to the nature of ruling parties in Angola, South Africa, and 
Zimbabwe. The findings show that high levels of centralization exist in all the parties 
included. Of course, UNITA and the ANC’s history as liberation movements have led to the 
natural development of party centralization, or “democratic centralism”, due to its initial 
hierarchical military structure. The ANC has certainly done the best in modernizing into a 
political party, but this comes as no surprise considering the intellectual foundations of the 
party dating back over 100 years. Where the culture of authoritarianism is most apparent 
is in the centralized structure of the MDC. Many within the MDC have grown up knowing 
only one power in Zimbabwe: ZANU-PF. Yet, the MDC did not start as a liberation 
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movement, but formed before the millennium as a political party based on 
constitutionalism. The research has shown that the structure and functions of the MDC are 
almost identical to those of ZANU-PF. Their committee system structure, along with its root 
















Over the course of this thesis political parties have been scrutinized to determine the use 
and degree of intra-party democracy in their organizations. The analysis included three 
different opposition, or former opposition, political parties: the National Union for the 
Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in Angola, the African National Congress (ANC) in 
South Africa, and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in Zimbabwe. The study 
provided not only an examination of parties in the SADC, but parties that evolved in states 
with different colonial experiences. To penetrate the veneer of these parties a historical 
analysis was conducted of the case states. This revealed the historic dynamics that led to 
the development of the armed struggle in these states as opposed to other African regions, 
which would greatly inform the parties in the future. Indeed, the states found here were 
some of the last to attain independence in Africa. To further appreciate the mentality of the 
parties currently, it was important to understand their past. To this aim, an historical 
analysis of the parties themselves was conducted. Party history provided the needed 
context to understand not just the structure and disposition parties currently hold, but also 
the critical findings of this study. In order to obtain these findings, the parties were 
measured by criteria made evident from immersion in the data. These benchmarks include: 
the political environment, a state and party’s legal framework concerning political parties, 





The purpose of this study is manifold. Besides determining levels of intra-party democracy 
and providing a regional analysis, one of the main objectives of this study was to develop a 
framework in order to measure parties. At the risk of redundancy, the introduction points 
out that scholarship on the internal functioning of political parties is relatively fresh, 
especially in Africa, and there exists no definitive framework for analysis of intra-party 
democracy. In fact, scholars have yet to agree on an unequivocal definition for this 
phenomenon. While this thesis does not claim to have created a framework or concrete 
definition, its aim was to help further this desire, and gain a better understanding of 
democratization in the region. This thesis could not have accomplished this without the 
insightful and informative literature of those who helped developed this debate. Lastly, 
another goal of this study included showing whether or not authoritarian culture in the 
case states impacted party structure and behavior.  
 According to the findings, parties were found to be lacking in areas of leadership 
competition, tolerance, and oversight. Across the board, competition for top leadership 
positions within parties remains very limited to all members, with the MDC perhaps most 
restrictive with its predetermined candidate lists. However, lower and mid-level leadership 
positions tend to be more open to competition, which can lead to more robust contests for 
higher offices in the future. Tolerance can and is an issue in every society, and with the 
many social cleavages that can appear in African societies it is reasonable to find lower 
levels of tolerance within parties. UNITA’s more militaristic background does not make it 
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more accommodating of divergent positions. The ANC is arguably the most tolerant party 
of this study, yet they can be given to incendiary rhetoric, and overreaction on the part of 
leadership. The MDC’s intolerance is the most prone to give rise to violence. Violence in the 
MDC is not quite systematic, but there is an affinity that reflects the daily political violence 
that has come to characterize Zimbabwe. Lack of oversight seems to be the most deficient 
component of intra-party democracy. UNITA and MDC members have virtually no 
oversight over leadership other than party elections, while the ANC membership has 
developed into a quasi-lobby that can act as a bulwark to its leaders. Few oversight 
mechanisms are included in the structure of party constitutions, if any at all.  
 These conditions have affected another critical area of intra-party democracy, the 
membership. The leadership of the parties takes point when it comes to determining and 
developing policy, marginalizing ordinary members. The findings show that the UNITA and 
the MDC’s grassroots outreach efforts are moderate at best. This tepid consultation stems 
partly from the centralization of leadership, but is probably more indicative of the fact that 
political violence and intimidation makes certain areas of the state hard to access for those 
parties. These parties are also far less resourceful than the ANC, which has high levels of 
rank-and-file member participation and can obviously access all the provinces of the state. 
Like their constitutions imply, parties are open to all adult citizens to join, and there is no 
systematic evidence that they do not follow this rule.  
 The parties score well in regard to striving for gender parity in its structures, 
especially when compared with other regions outside Africa. The ANC’s 50-50 gender 
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parity in all party structures is an example to political parties not just in Africa, but the 
world over. The MDC seems the least committed to the SADC’s 2015 gender parity goal, and 
shows that it still has a need to overcome the culture of patriarchy prevalent in 
Zimbabwean society. UNITA on the other hand is making strides towards parity, but even 
with a 1/3-gender quota, this still falls short of the parity target. No definitive statements 
can made on party economics concerning intra-party democracy except that it points to a 
severe lack of transparency, and can have implications for accountability.  
 These findings enhance our understanding of how deep democratic concepts have 
taken root within the societies of this study. The findings have hopefully illuminated not 
just the practices and legal structure of the parties, but also the extent to which democratic 
values have been assimilated into traditional values and how parties conceptualize 
themselves in that context. In addition to the course of the parties, the findings also 
strengthen our perception of the SADC’s democratic trajectory, at least in part. The study 
was limited in a few significant ways, however. The most conspicuous restraint was being 
limited to desk research, as opposed to conducting interviews and observations from the 
field. In practical terms, a journey to the Continent for this study was not feasible. Another 
constraint was the lack of data on the UNITA. Certainly decades of civil war has contributed 
to this, but Santana in his analysis points to high levels of mistrust among political players 
and the lack of a “research culture” in Angola.1 In addition, most data are in Angola’s 
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adoptive national language, Portuguese. And of course, the inherent limitations of the 
researcher are included.  
 This study is meant to be a starting point for analyzing levels of intra-party 
democracy, and there is a need for further, more extensive research. The model herein 
comprises a broad framework for the analysis of intra-party democracy, but the criteria for 
this determination can be expanded, or focused on more intensely. There is a greater need 
for a more systematic model for evaluation. Parties included in the thesis tend to sacrifice 
democratic practices in order to maintain stability, and the correlation this implies needs to 
be explored more thoroughly. Overall, the scholarship on the internal functions of political 
parties in Africa is burgeoning, but there remains much to be discovered. Also, this humble 
model can be applied, with variation, to other parties in different regions of the world.  
Policy Recommendations 
 
If this study can offer any recommendations to the case parties, it would be to create 
institutional structures within the party to guarantee oversight of the leadership; 
structures independent of leadership that would have the power to enforce its decisions. 
The parties of this study have informal or weak oversight mechanisms, and need something 
more systematic. Many of the problems of intra-party democracy stems from the lack of 
membership participation in determining policy, and parties will need to create 
mechanisms that ensure more active participation. This is especially true in the ANC, where 
there is a lack of genuine participation in leadership among white members. A mechanism 
will be needed by the ANC to ensure their non-racial stance. National leadership tends to 
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influence what gets put on the policy agenda, with rank-and-file members in a more policy-
advisory-role. At least in the case of the ANC, the time may have come for internal primary 
elections to open up leadership and encourage accountability.  
 It is worth noting that none of the party constitutions have a regulation stipulating 
term limits for leadership. The absence of term limits could be due to the maintenance of 
stability in the party, which makes sense for the MDC and UNITA, but the more developed 
ANC shows signs that the time has come for limits to be placed. The state electoral 
commissions, with the exception of South Africa’s IEC, need major reforms to ensure 
accountability of party leadership. In Angola and Zimbabwe, the electoral commissions, 
which are intended to be independent bodies, are highly susceptible to the ruling party’s 
influence. Their independence is crucial for democratic consolidation. 
 It may also be time to begin the decentralization of power throughout party 
structures. The data has shown that national leadership of the case parties tends to rely on 
this centralized composition. Lastly, while the analysis of party economics could not 
confirm much about internal democracy, it did exhibit a need for more transparency in 
party accounting, which also speaks to the necessity for decentralization at the national 
level. The lack of transparency in finances illustrates how this can create issues of trust for 
the community and party members alike. 
Hopefully this thesis has helped debunk the popular Western opinion that the Continent is 
permeated by violence, and has helped to show that democracy is a living, thriving, and 
dynamic force there. While there is violence, Africa is vast, and one cannot simply apply a 
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blanket analysis to describe an entire continent peopled by thousands of nations. It could 
be argued that the democratic awareness and discussion active in the Southern region and 
around the Continent is more vociferous than in the West, particularly the United States. 
Political parties in Southern Africa, and in all democratic states, must begin conceptualizing 
themselves as more than just actors aggressively seeking state power, but as learning 
centers who have a sacred function to encourage and pass on democratic values to an ever-
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